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Chapter 7: Trade Without Diplomatic Relations 
This sub-thesis deals with Sino-Japanese and Sino-Australian trade 
relations from 1960 to 1972. During this period, both Japan and Australia 
maintained trade ties with China (the People's Republic of China), although 
they had broken off diplomatic relations with her.1 The main interest here 
is how and why these trade relations were maintained without diplomatic 
relations. This, then, is a study of trade relations between states which 
have no diplomatic relationa 
Trade is commonly economic activity carried out by the private sector 
In non-socialist states. Diplomacy is the political activity of governments. 
Whereas trade relations represent economic interest between sellers and 
buyers, diplomatic relations represent political interest between the 
governments concerned. Although there is some difference between economic 
and political interest and between the interest of the private sector and 
that of the government, those interests often overlap and influence one 
another. 
It is sometimes said that "the absence of diplomatic relations between 
two states has tended to signify .. . [the fact] that their relations are so 
hostile as to make the exchange of ambassadors impossible".2 When the 
relationship between the states is politically hostile, economic relations 
tend to deteriorate. Unstable political atmosphere between states will make 
business representatives in one country hesitate to trade. Because they find 
1 Japan recognised China on 29 September, 1972. Australia 
recognised China on 21 December, 1972. 
2 Bull, Hedley (1977), The Anarchical Society , London: 
Hacmillan, p.173. 
2 
it difficult to expect positive support from their own or their trade 
partner's government when relations between the governments are 
antagonistic. Moreover, often trade controls or trade embargos are 
introduced by the government against the state with which it breaks off 
diplomatic relations. As the denial of economic intercourse with another 
country suggests disapproval of that country's policies and actions, trade 
can be used as an instrument for political ends. J Hence economic activities 
of the private sector are strongly influenced by the foreign policies of the 
governments especially in the case of trade between states which have no 
diplomatic relation a 
However, there is another important aspect of bilateral trade without 
diplomatic relations: the influence of economic factors 'on politics. As 
political relations influence the economic intercourse between two states, 
economic activities, in turn, influence foreign policies of the governments 
concerned. If bilateral trade brings about enormous interest towards the 
states concerned, and if the sector which is involved in the trade is 
powerful enough to pressurise the government, the government may lift or 
ease economic sanctions against the trade partner even though the bilateral 
political relations are so hostile that diplomatic relations are impossible. 
In extreme cases, a government may promote trade issues separately from 
political issues. 
3 See Baldwin, David (1985), Economic Statecraft, Princeton: 
Princeton University Press. Baldwin refers to the following cases 
as typical examples of economic sanctions: the League of Nations 
sanctions against Italy (1935-1936), the United States embargo 
against Japan (1940-1941), the restrictions on trade with communist 
countries imposed by the United States and Hestern Europe (1948-the 
present), United States sanctions against Cuba (1960-the present) 
and the United Nations sanctions against Rhodesia (1966-1979) . 
3 
Sino-Japanese trade and Sino-Australian trade in the period concerned 
examplify that trade can be maintained and developed between states despite 
the absence of diplomatic relations. At the same time, they illustrate the 
limits of trade in the absence of diplomatic relations. Questions which arise 
includ~ 
(1) Under what political and economic conditions can trade be maintained 
between states which have no diplomatic relations? 
(2) In what ways can trade be operated without diplomatic relations? 
(3) What are the limits of trade without diplomatic relations? 
(4) If the conditions that enable states to maintain trade without 
diplomatic relations change, what kind of changes can be observed 
in the bilateral trade? 
Seeking answers to the above questions, this thesis attempts to explain 
the behaviour of small or middle parties in the capitalist camp, such as 
Japan and Australia, towards their trade with China, a major party in the 
communist camp. When the international political environment was polarised, 
it was difficult for Japan and Australia to establish diplomatic relations 
with China without offending the United States. But since the main obstacle 
in establishing Sino-Japanese and Sino-Australian diplomatic relations was 
not directly related to the bilateral political issues, Japan and Australia 
put their economic interests first, and maintained trade with China 
separately from political issues such as the recognition of China. 
When the international political environment changed from the "Cold 
War" to "d~tente", China regarded recognition as the most important priority 
in her relations with Japan and Australia. Hence, China used trade as a 
weapon to get countries to recognise her and accept her political stance. 
4 
Consequently, Japan and Australia could no longer maintain bilateral trade 
separately from political issues. 
The second chapter inquires into the political and economIC conditions 
under which Japan and Australia maintained trade with China despite the 
absence of diplomatic relations. Particular attention is paid to the 
positions of Japan, Australia and China in the "Cold War" structure in the 
Asian-Pacific region during the 1960s which conditioned Sino-Japanese and 
Sino-Australian political and economic relations in the period concerned; and 
the Sino-Japanese and Sino-Australian trade structure which encouraged 
trade between these states. 
The third chapter focuses on institutional and operational aspects of 
trade without diplomatic relations. Business representatives engaged in 
trade with non-recognised countries tend to seek some measures to secure 
their businesses in an unstable environment, so special trade arrangements 
are usually required if there is to be trade without diplomatic relations. 
What special trade arrangements existed in Sino-Japanese and Sino-Australian 
trade at that time? 
The fourth chapter discusses the limits to trade without diplomatic 
relations. Although trade can sometimes be maintained without diplomatic 
relations, there are limits to such trade. The limits to Sino-Japanese and 
Sino-Australian trade are considered in the context of political influence on 
the trade. 
The fifth chapter discusses the change in the international atmosphere 
which surrounded Japan, Australia and China from the late 1960s to the 
early 1970s, and its influence on Sino-Japanese and Sino-Australian trade. 
5 
The final chapter reconsiders the incentives and limits to trade 
without diplomatic relations Sino-Japanese and Sino-Australian cases. 
6 
Chapter IT: Incentives to Trade Without Diplomatic Relations 
During the 1960s, Japan and Australia were able to maintain trade with 
China although they did not have diplomatic relations with her. This 
chapter seeks to explain why Sino-Japanese and Sino-Australian trade could 
be maintained despite the absence of diplomatic relations. The political 
considerations which prevented the establishment of diplomatic relations 
among the states concerned and the economic considerations which encouraged 
bilateral trade, are discussed. 
The "Cold War" in the Asian-Pacific region was the main obstacle In 
the establishment of diplomatic relations. 
The maIn interest in trade derived from trade structures which 
promoted economIC exchange between these states. 
Japan and the "Cold War" 
The lack of diplomatic relations between Japan and China was 
principally the result of the structure of the international atmosphere 
rather than any special political issues between Japan and China. The post-
war "Cold War" structure in the Asian-Pacific region was the main factor 
influencing Sino-Japanese relationship throughout these years. 
Japan was occupied by the United States after she lost the Second 
World War. The United States later initiated negotiations for a peace treaty. 
When Japan signed a peace treaty with the Western Nations in San Francisco 
7 
In 1951, she failed to come to terms with China. 1 China was excluded from 
the negotiations on the San Francisco Peace Treaty from the beginning. The 
United States did not invite China to the negotiations because she was 
fighting with China In Korea at that time, and therefore, regarded China as 
an aggressIve power In the Asian-Pacific region. 2 Japan's peace 
negotiations with China were separate from the San Francisco Treaty.3 
Initially Japan did not want to conclude a peace treaty with China hastily 
because of indecision as to which government in China, the Communist 
Government in Beijing or the Nationalist Government in Taipei, was to cosign 
a peace treaty. The United States strongly pressurised Japan to choose the 
1 
"Treaty of Peace with Japan" was signed between Japan and 
45 states in San Francisco on 8 September, 1951. China and the 
Soviet Union did not attend the negotiation. On the negotiation of 
the peace treaty, see Yoshida, Shigaru (1978), Gekido No Hyakunen-
shi (A History of Turbulent One Hundred Years), Tokyo: Shirakawa 
shoin, pp.149-164; and Igarashi, Takeshi (1985), "Reisen To Kowa 
(Cold Har and Peace Treaty)" in Ratanake, Akio (ed.) Sengo Nihon No 
Taigai Seisaku (The Japanese External Policy after the Second Rorld 
Har), Tokyo: Yuhikaku, pp.32-57; and Hosoya, Chihiro (1984), 
Sanfuranshisuko Kowa Beno Hichi, (Process of Negotiations on the San 
Francisco Peace Treaty), Tokyo Chuow Koron-sha. 
2 The Korean Rar started on 25 June, 1950. China joined the war 
on 26 November, 1950. The United Nations General Assembly approved 
a resolution, in which China was regarded as an aggressor, on 1 
February 1951. 
3 In reference to negotiations on a peace treaty between Japan 
and China (Taiwan), see Ishii, Akira (1985), "Taiwan Ka Pekin Ka; 
(Taiwan or Beijing)" in Hatanabe, (ed.), QQ. cit., pp.62-85; and 
Imazu, Hiroshi (1971), "Nitchu Kokko Kaifuku No Hichi-shirube 
(Signposts towards Normalisation of Sino-Japanese Relations)" in 
Asahi Shimbun-sha (ed) (1971) Nitchu Kankei Towa Nanika (Hhat are 
Sino-Japanese Relations?) Tokyo: Asahi Shimbun-sha, pp. 131 -1 36 . 
8 
Nationalist Government. 4 The United states regarded Japan's conclusion of 
a peace treaty with Taipei as an important condition for ratification of the 
San Francisco Peace Treaty. As Prime Minister Yoshida says in his memoirs, 
Japan had no choice but to accept the United States' demand in such a 
si tua tion. 5 
Once Japan established diplomatic relations with Taiwan, following the 
United States' "Cold War" view based on containment towards China, Japan 
found it very difficult to recognise Beijing as long as the "Cold War" 
between the United States and China continued. As political harmony with 
the United States was a core of Japan's foreign policy, Japan could not 
establish diplomatic relations with China against America's wishes. This 
"Cold War" situation hardly improved up to the late 1960s. 
Although Japan did not have diplomatic relations with China, she did 
not stop economic intercourse with China completely. As China had held 
almost one-third of Japan's total trade before the Second World War, the 
Japanese wanted to continue trade with China despite the absence of 
diplomatic relations and in spite of changes in the political systems In both 
countries. Japan started trade with China even before the ceasefire In 
4 Prime Hinister Yoshida wrote a letter to Dulles, the United 
States Secretary of States, on 24 December, 1951. Yoshida promised 
that Japan would conclude a peace treaty with Taipei. Yoshida wrote 
this letter at the request of Dulles. Japan concluded a peace 
treaty with the Nationalist Government on 28 April, 1952. In 
respect to Yoshida's letter, see Kazan-kai (ed.), ( 1970), Ni tchu 
Kankei Kihon Shiryo-shu (Basic Haterials on Sino-Japanese 
Relations), Tokyo: Kazan-kai, pp.27-31. 
Yoshida, QQ. ci t., pp. 162-164. 
9 
Korea. 0 Japan concluded unofficial trade agreements with China under the 
initiative of some members of the parliament. 7 As trade with China was 
supported not only by the Japanese Socialist Party and the Japanese 
Communist Party but also some members of the Liberal Democratic Party (the 
government party), the Japanese government could not neglect opinion in the 
In reference to a resumption of Sino-Japanese trade after the 
Second Rorld Rar, see Takahashi, Shogoro & Tanaka, Shujiro (1968), 
Nitchu Boeki Kyoshitsu (A Lecture on Sino-Japanese Trade), Tokyo: 
Seinen Shuppan-sha, pp.44-61; Nihon-Chugoku Yoko Kyokai (Seito) 
ChuoR-Honbu (ed.) (1975), Nitchu Yuko Undo-shi (A History of Sino-
Japanese Friendship Hovement), Tokyo: Seinen Shuppan-sha, pp.28-50; 
Kasama, Shigetoshi (1961), Dainiji Sekai-Taisen-go Nitchu Koryu-shi. 
(A History of Sino-Japanese Intercourses after the Second Rorld 
Rar), Tokyo: Heigen Shobo; Hiraoka, Kentaro (1956), Nitchu Boeki Ron 
(An Essay on Sino-Japanese Trade), Tokyo, Nihon Hyoron Shin-sha; 
Hiyashi ta, Tadao (1955), Chunichi Boeki No Kenkyu (A Study on Sino -
Japanese Trade), Tokyo: Ni hon Gai sei Gakkai; and Ishii, Osamu 
(1987), "Tai-chu Kinyu To Nihon No Keizai Jiritsu (China Trade 
Embargo and Japan's Viability)" in Kokusai Seji (International 
Relations) Vol. 85, Hay 1987, Tokyo: Kokusai Seiji Gakkai (The Japan 
Association of International Relations), pp.115-132. 
7 Three members of the parliament (Tomi Takara, Kei Hoashi and 
Kisuke Hiyakoshi) visited Beijing, after they attended the 
International Economi Conference held in HOSCOR in April, 1952. 
They signed the first (unofficial) Sino-Japanese Trade Agreement 
Rith the Chinese authorities on 1 June, 1952. In reference to this, 
see Takahashi & Tanaka, QQ. cit., pp.53-55; and Nihon Chugoku Yuko 
Kyokai (Sei to) ChUOR Honbu, QQ. ci t., pp. 53-56, pp. 209-213. 
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par liamen t. & Japan, therefore, tried to separate trade Issues from political 
Issues, and put trade Issues first In her relations with China. 
Australia and the "Cold War" 
As with Japan, Australia also commited herself to the "Cold War" 
alliances. Australia supported America's Asian strategy as Australia felt 
vulnerable, because of her distance from Europe, and proximity to populous 
and poor Asian neighbour countries like China. Australia needed "strong ... 
reliable allies that had natural interests in Australia's corner of the globe 
and could be expected to share our [Australia's] interests in a stable and 
secure Far East". 9 Since the Second World War, the United States had been 
the only great power which could meet these Australian expectations. It was 
symbolic that Australia acted differently from the United Kingdom in terms 
of recognising China and followed the United States' China containment 
Nitchu Boeki Sokushin Giin Renmei (Japanese Parliament 
Member's Association for Promotion of Sino-Japanese Trade) Ras 
established 12 December, 1952. Members of the government party as 
Rell as the opposition party joined the association. Several 
resolutions on Sino-Japanese trade promotion Rere passed in both 
Houses. For exampl e: Resol ution on Si no-Japanese trade promotion 
(29 April, 1950, the House of Counsellors); Resol ution on Sino-
Japanese trade promotion (29 July, 1953, the House of 
Representatives); Resolution on Sino-Japanese trade promotion (30 
July, 1953, the House of Counsellors); Resolution on invitation for 
Chi nese trade mi ssi on (1 7 December, 1954, the House of 
Representatives); Resolution on Sino-Japanese trade promotion (30 
March, 1956, the House of Representatives); and Resolution on Sino-
Japanese trade promotion (12 December, 1956, the House of 
Representatives). See Nitchu Kokko Kaifuku Sokushin Giin Renmei 
(ed . ) (1971), Ni tchu Kankei Shiryo-shu (1945-1971) (Documents of 
Sino-Japanese relations), Tokyo: Nitchu Kokko Kaifuku Sokushin Giin 
Renmei, pp. 1 -5. 
Babbage, Ross (1984), "Australian Defence Planning, Force 
Structure and Equipment: The American Effect" in The Australian 
Outlook, Vol. 38, No.3, December 1984, p.163. 
1 1 
policy. 1 0 Australia not only concluded, the ANZUS Treaty (Security Treaty 
between Australia, New Zealand and the United States of America) but also 
joined SEATO (South-East Asia Treaty Organisation). The aim of SEATO was to 
provide a collective defence against China and Chinese communism. t t 
Australia sent her troops to Korea and Vietnam in response to America's 
requests. It was thus difficult for Australia to maintain diplomatic 
relations with China. Moreover, anti-communist feelings mixed with anti-
Chinese feelings dominated Australian society. The Australian government 
could hardly change its anti-China policy because this policy was supported 
by many of the electorate. 12 Commenting on Australia's commitment to the 
"Cold War", Edmund Fung says: 
Once Australia had joined the American camp, its foreign 
policy became so tightly tied to that of the United States 
that it was impossible to act independently on such important 
issues as recognition of Beijing and China's United Nations 
membership without offending Washington. During the cold 
war era of the 1950s, international politics were so polarized 
t 0 The Chifley government (Labor) hesitated to recognise Beijing 
before the general election (December 1949). In reference to this, 
see Millar, T. B. (1978), Australia in Peace and Har, Canberra: 
Australian National University Press, pp.276-282; Albinski, Henry 
(1965), Australian Policies and Atti tudes toward China, Princeton: 
Princeton Uni versi ty Press, pp.5-45; Andrews, E. M. (1985), Australia 
and China, Melbourne: Melbourne University Press, pp.121-147; and 
Fung Edmund & Mackerras, Colin (1985), From Fear to Friendship, 
St. Lucia, Queensland: Uni versi ty of Queensland Press, pp.19-21. 
1 1 Australia concluded the ANZUS Treaty on 1 September, 1951. 
SEATO was established on 8 September, 1954. The signatories were 
Australia, France, New Zealand, Pakistan, the Philippines, Thailand, 
the United Kingdom and the United States of America. 
1 2 In reference to anti-Chinese feelings in Australia, see Huck. 
Arthur "Image of China: The Idea of "China" in Australian Poli tics" 
and King, Jonathan "Image of China: A Big Gross Ogre, an Illiterate 
Giant". Both articles are in The Australian Outlook, Vol. 24, No.3, 
December 1970, pp.309-327 
12 
that the conduct of normal diplomacy between rival states 
was difficult and in some cases impossible. 1 J 
The volume of Australia's trade with China during the 1950s was very 
small, influenced by a hostile political relationship between the two 
coun tries. 1 4 After 1960, Australia exported large amounts of wheat to 
China. The wheat trade was of substantial economic interest for Australian 
farmers, who had strong influence on Australian trade policies. This trade 
made the Australian government separate trade from politics. As with Japan, 
the Australian government tried to promote the wheat trade while 
maintaining anti-China policies. The Australian government's attitude 
towards China is discussed in the fourth chapter. 
China and the "Cold War" 
During the "Cold War" era, China was isolated from the international 
society both politically and economically. China was confronted by the 
United states and her allies as well as the Soviet Union. The United States 
kept up a total trade embargo on China. Other Western states controlled 
exports of strategic commodities to China. The Soviet Union began to reduce 
economic support to China after the Sino-Soviet political split which 
escalated during the 1960s. 1 ' As a result, China was compelled to build 
her national economy through her own efforts under the slogan of "self-
1 3 Fung, & Hackerras, QQ. cit., p.24. 
1 4 Shares of Australia's exports to China in Australia's total 
exports during the 1950s were between 0.1 and 1.7 per cent . The 
share of Australia's imports from China in total Australia 's imports 
were between O. 2 and O. 4 per cent. 
1 , On 16 July, 1960, the Soviet Union gave notice to China that 
she would withdraw all her technical assistants <about 1,300 
persons) from China within one month. 
13 
reliance". But "self-reliance" did not necessarily mean autarky. China 
needed trade partners who could be expected to provide goods and technology 
necessary for her economic development. Tables 1 shows China's direction of 
trade during the 1960s. This table illustrates a significant shift in China's 
geographic trade pattern from socialist countries to capitalist countries 
(except the United states). From 1960 to 1970, the share of China's trade 
with socialist countries decreased from 65.7 to 19.8 per cent of her total 
trade. During the same period, the share of China's trade with capitalist 
countries increased from 18.7 to 51.4 per cent of her total trade. Japan and 
Australia were China's most important trade partners during this decade, 
although they did not have diplomatic relations with China. Clearly, China 
may have given priority to trade rather than establishment of diplomatic 
relations in respect to her relations with Japan and Australia. 
China's "world view" which was developed during the "Cold War" era, 
encouraged the development of economic intercourses with Japan and 
Australia. t b Accordingly, she distinguished the United states from other 
capitalist states like Japan and Australia. The United states and Soviet 
Union, the "Super Powers", were "the world's biggest international oppressors 
and exploiters; they are [were] the imperialists and hegemonists... The 
danger of a new world war comes from them" . t 7 Japan and Australia 
belonged to the "Second World" which comprised the rest of the developed 
world. The Second World "is [was] said to oppress and exploit the Third 
World [in which China herself was involved], but to share with the Third 
t b In reference to China's Rorld vieR, see FitzGerald, Stephen 
( 1977), China and the Rorld. Canberra: Australian National 
University Press. 
t 7 ibid., p.14. 
TABLE 1 Direction of China's Foreign Trade. 1959-1970 
A, Cbina's Total Irade 
1959 1960 1961 1962 1963 1964 
US$. ~ US$. ~ US$III ~ US$III ~ US$III ~ US$M ~ 
Socialist world 2,980 69. 5 2,620 65 . 7 1,680 55.7 1, 405 52. 6 1, 250 45.0 1, 100 H.2 
USSR 2,055 47 . 6 1,665 41. 7 915 30 . 3 750 28 . 1 600 21. 6 450 U .O 
Non-socialist world 1, 310 30. 5 1, 370 H . 3 1,335 U.3 1,265 47.4 1, 525 54.9 2, 120 65. 8 
Developed countries u. a . 745 18. 7 820 27 . 2 685 25.6 845 30 . 4 1, 100 34.2 
Australia 39 0.9 34 0.9 167 5. 5 109 4. 1 225 8 . 1 174 5. 4 
Japan 23 O. 5 24 O. 6 46 1.5 84 3. 1 137 4 . 9 310 9. 6 
USA u. a. u. a. n 0 n n 
Less developed countries u. a. u. a. 400 13 . 3 U5 16.7 495 17. 8 745 23 . 1 
Hong I:ong u. a. 480 12 . 0 116 3.8 140 5. 2 172 6. 2 255 7.9 
..... 
TOTAL 4,290 100,0 3,990 100.0 3,015 100 . 0 2,670 100.0 2,775 100.0 ~ 3,220 100,0 
1965 1966 1967 1968 1969 1970 
Socialist world 1, 165 30.0 1,090 25.7 830 21. 3 840 22.3 785 20.3 860 19 . 8 
USSR 415 10. 7 320 7.5 105 2.7 95 2. 5 55 1. 4 47 1.1 
Non-socialist world 2, 715 70.0 3, 155 74.3 3,065 78.7 2,925 77.7 3,075 79. 7 3,480 80. 2 
Developed countries 1, 495 38. 5 1,855 43.7 1,980 50. 8 1,870 49.7 1,930 50.0 2,230 51. 4 
Australia 220 5.7 121 2.8 232 6.0 147 3. 9 165 4. 3 175 4. 0 
Japan 478 12. 3 631 14.9 569 14.6 567 15. 1 654 16.9 855 19. 7 
OSA n n n n n n 
Less developed countries 1,220 31. 4 1,300 30. 6 1,085 27.9 1,055 28.0 1, 145 29.7 1,250 28.8 
Hon9 l:on9 342 8 . 8 380 8. 9 292 7.5 311 8. 3 327 8 . 5 479 11. 0 
TOTAL 3,880 100.0 4,245 100.0 3,895 100,0 3,765 100.0 3,860 100.0 4,340 100,0 
u. a. unavailable n negligible 
B, Cbi DB'! III!SU::tl 
1959 1960 1961 1962 1963 1964 USS .. % USSII % USSm % USSm % USSm % US$11I % 
Soci ali st Jlorld 1, 615 72.4 1, 335 68 . 1 965 63.3 915 60. 2 820 52. 1 710 40 . 6 USSR 1, 100 49.3 850 43.4 550 36. 1 515 33.9 415 26. 3 315 18 . 0 
Non-socialist Jlorld 615 27.6 625 31. 9 560 36.7 605 39. 8 755 47.9 1,040 59. 4 
Developed countries u. a. 240 12. 2 220 14.4 210 13. 8 265 16 . 8 415 23.7 Australia 8 O. 4 11 O. 5 7 O. 5 11 0 . 7 15 O. 9 23 1.3 Japan 19 O. 8 21 1.1 29 1.9 44 2.9 71 4.5 150 8.6 USA u. a. u. a. n 0 n n 
Less developed countries u. a. 245 12. 5 225 14.7 260 17. 1 305 19 . 4 350 1. O. 0 Bong long u. a. u. a. 115 7.5 138 9. 1 170 10. 8 253 U .S 
I-' TOTAL 2.230 100,0 1.960 100,0 1.525 100.0 1.520 100,0 1.575 100,0 1.750 100,0 U1 
1965 1966 1967 1968 lill 1970 
Socialist Jlorld 650 31. 9 585 26. 5 485 24 . 9 500 25.7 490 24. 1 480 22.9 USSR 225 11. 1 145 6 . 6 55 2. 8 35 1.8 30 1.5 22 1.0 
Non-socialist Jlorld 1,385 68. 1 1,625 73.5 1, 460 75. 1 1, 445 74.3 1,540 75.9 1,615 77. 1 
Developed countries 575 28. 3 715 32.4 635 32.6 620 31. 9 685 33. 7 675 32. 2 Australia 30 1. 5 25 1.1 29 1.5 32 1.6 37 1.8 40 1 . 9 Japan 221 10. 9 300 13. 6 266 13.7 222 11. 4 239 11. 8 255 12. 2 USA n n n n n n 
Less developed oountriea 810 39. 8 910 41. 2 825 42. 4 825 '2. , 855 42. 1 940 U.9 Hong long 339 16 . 7 377 17. 1 291 15.0 310 15. 9 326 16. 1 468 22. 3 
TOTAL 2.035 100.0 2.210 100.0 1.945 100.0 1.945 100.0 2.030 100.0 2.095 100. O' 
u. a. unavailable n negligible 
C. China's Imports 
1959 1960 1 961 1962 1963 1964 
US$m % US$m % USSm % US$m % US$m % US$m % 
Socialist world 1,365 66 . 3 " 285 63. 3 715 48.0 490 '2.6 430 35.8 390 26 . 5 
USSR 955 46.4 815 40 . 1 365 24. 5 235 20. , 1 B 5 15. , 1 35 9 . 2 
Non -socialist world 695 33. 7 745 36.7 775 52.0 660 57. 4 770 64. 2 1,080 73 . 5 
Developed countries u . a. 505 24. 9 600 40. 3 475 41. 3 5BO '8 . 3 685 46.6 
Australia 30 1.5 24 1.2 160 10. 7 98 8. 5 210 17. 5 1 53 10. 3 
Japan 4 0 . 2 3 O. 1 1 7 1.1 40 3. 5 66 5. 5 160 10. 9 
USA 0 0 0 0 0 0 
Less developed countries u . a . 235 11. 6 175 11. 7 185 1 6. 1 190 15. 8 395 26. 9 
Hong Kong u. a. n O. 1 2 0.2 2 O. 2 2 O. 1 
TOTAL 2,060 100 . 0 2,030 1 OQ . 0 1,490 ~ 100.0 1 ~~!HL~JL_L~ng __ 1g() . 0 1,470 100 . 0 C7\ 
1965 1966 1967 1968 1969 1970 
Socialist world 51 5 27. 9 505 24. 8 345 17. 7 340 18. 7 295 1 6. 1 380 16. 9 
USSR 190 10. 3 175 B. 6 50 2.6 60 3. 3 25 1 . 4 25 1.1 
Non-socialist Norld 
" 330 72 . 1 " 530 75. 2 " 605 82. 3 1, 480 81. 3 1,535 83.9 " 865 83. 1 
Developed countries 920 49. 9 1 , 1 40 56 . 0 1. 345 69.0 1, 250 68. 7 1, 245 68. 0 1, 555 69. 3 
Australia 190 10. 3 96 4. 7 203 10. 4 11 5 6 . 3 128 7.0 1 35 6. 0 
Japan 257 1 3. 9 331 16. 3 303 15. 5 345 19. 0 415 22. 7 600 26 . 7 
USA 0 n n n n n 
Less developed countries 410 22. 2 390 19. 2 260 13. 3 230 12. 6 290 15. 8 310 1 3. 8 
Hong Kong 5 0 . 2 5 O. 1 O. 1 1 O. 1 1 O. 1 1 1 O. 5 
TOTAL 1 , 845 100 . 0 2,035 100 . 0 1,950 100 . 0 1 ,820 100.0 1 ,830 100 . 0 2, H5 100 . 0 
u . a . unavailable n negligible 
So urce : K. D. Ducknall. Australia-China Trade. 
Australia - As ia Paper No . 9, Centre for the Study of Australian-Asian Relat i ons , 
Gr :iffith University, 1983. 
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World In struggle against the Super Powers". 1 8 China's co-operation with 
Japan and Australia was, thus, meaningful in the context of the struggle 
against American imperialism. China also distinguished between governments 
and the people in the Second World. Whereas the governments in the Second 
World tended to share the interest of the Super Powers and cooperate with 
them in exploiting the Third World and their own people, the people in the 
Second World shared common interests with the Third World in the struggle 
against the Super Powers and their own governments. 19 China's attitude 
towards Japan and Australia in the period concerned is, therefore, 
understandable. Although China condemned the Japanese and the Australian 
governments for their anti-China behaviour, she maintained trade with Japan 
and Australia on the basis of "people-to-people" trade. It can be argued 
that China's view on world politics made Sino-Japanese and Sino-Australian 
trade workable despite the absence of diplomatic relations. It can also be 
argued that China adjusted her political view so as to rationalise her 
economic intercourses with Japan and Australia. In both cases, international 
atmosphere in the "Cold War" era conditioned China's political and economic 
relations with Japan and Australia. 
Sino-Japanese Trade Structure 
Sino-Japanese trade developed on the basis of a highly complementary 
relationship between both economies. 
1 8 i bi d., p. 1 5. 
For example, China's view on the Japanese government and 
Japanese people was reflected on Professor Oyama's interview with 
Premier Zhou Enlai on 28 September) 1953. See Kazan-kai, (ed.) 
2£. ci t., pp.50-52; and/or Horishi ta, Shuichi (ed.), (1978), Shu On-
Rai Sen-shu (Selected Rords of Zhu Enlai), Tokyo: Chugoku Shoten, 
pp.709-711. 
18 
Japan achieved high economIC growth based on heavy and chemical 
industries during the 1960s. As her domestic market was comparatively small 
and reserves of natural resources poor, she attached special importance to 
foreign trade in order to expand her export market and secure sources of 
raw materials. 
China, on the other hand, had a large population and large reserves 
of natural resources, but her level of economic development was considerably 
lower. China, then, had a self-supporting economic development strategy, 
gIVIng priority to increasing agricultural production and improving related 
infrastructures. Foreign trade was not as important for China as it was for 
Japan, but it had a supplementary role in so far as it contributed to the 
economic development strategy. 
Taking account of general economIC conditions in both countries, it 
seems natural that Japan should have considered China a good trade partner, 
and vice versa. Japan could supply steel, fertiliser and various machines 
which helped China's economic development. China, in return, could provide 
raw materials and foodstuffs which satisfied Japanese demands. It could be 
expected that so-called "mutual dependence" would characterise Sino-Japanese 
trade. Undoubtedly, this mutual dependence between both economies was an 
incentive for the growth of bilateral trade. 
A glance at the commodity structure of Sino-Japanese trade suggests 
that mutual dependence existed. Tables 2 and 3 show the commodity 
composition of trade during the 1960s. The share of heavy and chemical 
industry goods in Japanese exports increased constantly and reached 94 per 
cent in the last year of the decade. Among them, steel, fertiliser and 
machinery were the three largest Japnese export items to China. Apart from 
TABLE 2 Commodity Compopition of Japan's Exports to China. 1960-1969 
1960 1961 1962 1963 1964 
US$nI % US$nI % US$m % USSR! % US$. % 
Heavy Industry's Goods O. 66 ( 2() 10.70 ( 64) 21.60 ( 56) 47.69 ( 76) 119.14 ( 78) 
Metal 0.06 (1) 7.79 ( (6) 11. 15 ( 29) 12. 43 ( 20) 36. 26 ( 24) 
Steel 0.05 (1) 7. 41 ( (5) 10.64 ( 27) 11. 97 ( 19) 35 . 15 ( 23) 
CheMical Goods 0.34 ( 1 3) 2. 51 ( 1 5) 8.85 ( 23) 29. 92 ( (8) 60. 92 ( (0) 
Fertiliser 0.14 ( 5) 1. 68 ( 10) 7. 17 ( 1 9) 26. 54 ( (3) 52. 08 ( 34) 
Machinery O. 25 ( 9) 0.40 ( 2) 1. 60 ( 4) 5.32 ( 9) 21. 95 ( 14) 
Li9ht Industry's Goods 1. 10 ( (0) 4. 58 ( 28) 15.60 ( (0) 13. 58 ( 22) 33. 44 . ( 21 ) 
Textile 1. 02 ( 37) 2. 22 ( 1 3) 14. 20 ( 37) 12. 87 ( 211 27.62 ( 1 8) 
Others 0.96 ( 35) 1. 35 ( 8) 1. 26 ( 3) 1.14 ( 2) O. 15 ( 0) 
TOTAL 2.72 (100) . 1 fi.ti3 . ( U>O). __ 3ft. f6 (10Q) __ . fi2.f1 ( 1 QO) 152. 73 ( 100) 
1965 1966 1967 1968 1969 
Heavy Industry's Goods 209.61 ( 86) 282 . 80 ( 90) 256 . 55 ( 89) 298.84 ( 92) 366. 63 ( 9') 
Metal 48. 88 ( 20) 113. 30 ( 36) 113. 89 ( (0) 154.21 ( (7) 195.94 ( 50) 
Steel 46.46 ( 19) 107. 07 ( 34) 102. 66 ( 36) 136. 23 ( (2) 163.41 ( (2) 
CheMical Goods 92. 58 ( 38) 115.65 ( 37) 98.65 ( 34) 111. 70 ( 34) 122. 39 ( 311 
Fertiliser 69 . 73 ( 28) 86. 39 ( 27) 66 . 63 ( 23) 73.99 ( 23) 80.77 ( 21> 
Machinery 68.14 ( 28) 53.84 ( 17) U.OO ( 1 5) 32. 91 ( 10) 48.30 ( 12) 
Li9ht Industry's Goode 33. 58 ( 14) 30. 26 ( 10) 28.60 ( 10) 23.32 (7) 19.72 ( 5) 
Textil e 27.66 ( 11) 25.30 ( 8) 24.98 ( 9) 18. 16 ( 6) 17.69 ( 5) 
Others 1.84 (1) 2.09 (1) 3.14 (1) 3.27 (1) 4. 45 (1) 
TOTAL 2'5.03 ( 100) 315. 15 ( 100) 288, 29 ( 100) 325. '3 ( 100) 390. 80 ( 100) 
Source: Japanese Ministry of International Trade and Industry 
Tsusho Hakusho (White Paper on Trade) 1961-1970. 
~ 
\0 
Food 
Marine Food 
Rice 
Maize 
Raw Materials & Fuel 
Raw Silk 
Iron Ore 
Soybean 
Salt 
Coal 
Textile Goods 
Steel 
Others 
TOTAL 
Food 
Marine Food 
Rice 
Maize 
Raw Materials & Fuel 
Raw Silk 
Iron Ore 
Soybean 
Salt 
Coal 
Textile Goods 
Steel 
Others 
TOTAL 
TABLE 3 Commodity Composition of Japan's Imports from China, 1960-1969 
1960 
US$m 
7.22 
0.53 
o 
o 
10. 10 
o 
o 
0.02 
o 
0.05 
o 
1. 28 
2. 19 
% 
( H) 
( 2) 
( 0) 
( 0) 
( 48) 
( 0) 
( 0) 
( 0) 
( 0) 
( 0) 
( 0) 
( 6) 
( 1 0) 
1961 
US$m 
4 .67 
O. U 
o 
o 
16. 83 
o 
o 
4.99 
0.57 
O. 21 
o 
4.25 
5. 10 
% 
( 1 5) 
(1) 
( 0) 
( 0) 
( 54) 
( 0) 
( 0) 
( 1 6) 
( 2) 
( 1 ) 
( 0) 
( 14) 
( 1 6) 
20.79 (100) 30.89 (100) 
1965 
81. 24 
17. 83 
25. 98 
15. 90 
96.38 
3. H 
2.46 
45 .29 
7. 15 
8. 15 
2.05 
24.20 
20.83 
1966 
(36) 124.94 
(8) 31 . 0 
(12) 51.36 
(7) 9.50 
(42) 129 .5 8 
(2) 10.58 
(1) 3.58 
(20) 49.18 
(3) 8.24 
(4) 12.56 
(1) 6.41 
(11) 21.47 
(9) 23.83 
( 41) 
( 1 0) 
( 1 7) 
( 3) 
( 42) 
( 3) 
(1) 
( 1 6) 
( 3) 
( 4) 
( 2) 
(7) 
( 8) 
1962 
US$m 
S.29 
2. 31 
o 
o 
30.03 
o 
o 
16. 45 
2. 61 
2. 48 
o 
1. 05 
6. 65 
% 
( 1 8) 
( 5) 
( 0) 
( 0) 
( 65) 
( 0) 
( 0) 
( 36) 
( 6) 
( 5) 
( 0) 
( 2) 
( 14) 
46.02 (100) 
1967 
90.57 
16.00 
33.98 
5.24 
133 .53 
16.48 
2.78 
47 . 59 
8.88 
15. 05 
13. 16 
9. 60 
22. 57 
( 34) 
( 6) 
( 1 3) 
( 2) 
( 50) 
( 6) 
(n 
( 18) 
( 3) 
( 6) 
( 5) 
( 4) 
( 8) 
1963 
US$m 
19. 88 
5.25 
o 
5.14 
42.22 
o 
o 
23. 80 
3.55 
1. 77 
o 
3. 50 
8.99 
% 
( 27) 
( 7) 
( 0) 
( 7) 
( 57) 
( 0) 
( 0) 
( 32) 
( 5) 
( 2) 
( 0) 
( 5) 
( 12) 
1964 
US$m 
37. 85 
15. 99 
o 
8. 81 
61. 54 
O. 28 
0.76 
30. 48 
6. 21 
3. 35 
O. 88 
45. 33 
12. 15 
% 
( 24) 
( 1 0) 
( 0) 
( 6) 
( 39) 
( 0) 
( 0) 
( 1 9) 
( 4) 
( 2) 
( 0) 
( 29) 
( 8) 
7',!i~( 1 gg) . 157.75 ( 100) 
1968 
72.58 
13. 59 
19 . 15 
2.89 
110.30 
10. 78 
0.75 
46. 12 
6. 53 
4. 21 
17. 31 
1. 45 
22. 54 
( 32) 
( 6) 
( 9) 
(1) 
( 49) 
( 5) 
( 0) 
( 20) 
( 3) 
( 2) 
( 8) 
(1) 
( 10) 
1969 
53. SO 
15. 62 
o 
o 
122.86 
20. 15 
O. 16 
42. 32 
9.29 
3.64 
26 .66 
O. 20 
31. 02 
( 23) 
( 6) 
( 0) 
( 0) 
( 52) 
( 9) 
( 0) 
( 1 8) 
( 4) 
( 2) 
( 11) 
( 0) 
( 1 3) 
224.70 (100) 306.23 (100) 269.43 (100) 224.18 (100) 2H.5' (100) 
Source: Japanese Ministry of International Trade and Industry 
Tsusho Hakusho (Rhite Paper on Trade) 1961-70. 
tv 
o 
TABLE 4 The ValuetShare and Balance of Japan's Trade with China}. 1960-1969 
1960 
1961 
1962 
1963 
1964 
1965 
1966 
1967 
1968 
1969 
A B C D E 
Japan's A's Share Japan's C' s Share Japan's 
Exports in Japan's Imports in Japan's Total China 
to China Total from Total 
Source: 
Exports China Imports 
US$m % US$m % 
2.72 o. 1 20. 72 O. 5 
16 . 63 0 . 4 30. 89 O. 5 
38. 46 O. 8 46. 02 O. 8 
62. 41 1.1 74. 59 1.1 
152.73 2. 3 157.75 2. 0 
245 . 03 2. 9 224.70 2.8 
315.15 3.2 306.23 3.2 
288 .29 2. 8 269.43 2.3 
325.43 2. 5 224.18 1 . 7 
390.80 2. 4 234.54 1 . 6 
Japanese Ministry of International Trade & Industry 
Tsusho Hakusho (Rhite Paper on Trade) 1961-70 
Trade 
(A + C) 
US$m 
23. 45 
47. 53 
84. 48 
137.01 
310.48 
469 .7 4 
621 .38 
557.73 
549.62 
625.34 
F 
Trade 
Balance 
(A - C) 
US$m 
- 18.00 
-1 4. 25 
-7. 56 
-12.18 
-5. 01 
20. 33 
8. 91 
18 . 85 
101 .25 
156 .26 
AIC 
tv 
...... 
O. 1 3 
O. 53 
0.83 
0.84 
0 .9 7 
1 . 09 
1 . 03 
1 . 07 
1 .45 
1 . 66 
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textile goods, the maln Japanese import items were raw materials and 
foodstuffs such as soybean, rice, malze, marlne foods, coal, iron ore and salt. 
In addition to these items, Japan imported large amounts of steel from China, 
mostly pig-iron which was reprocessed to complete steel goods in Japan. 
Unlike export items such as steel and fertiliser, there was no single import 
item which held a predominant share throughout the decade. 
As Table 4 shows, the value of Sino-Japanese trade grew steadily in 
the first half of the 1960s. Japan became China's largest trade partner 
after 1965 (see Table 1). For Japan, China's share in total trade was 
rela ti vely small. During the 1960s, the share of Japan's exports to China 
never exceeded 3.2 per cent of her total exports. (See Table 4). But China 
was an important market for particular industries, such as steel and 
fertiliser. 
Japan, the third-largest steel producer and the largest steel exporter 
ln the world, supplied more than two-thirds of Chinese steel imports at the 
end of the 1 960s. :2 0 It could offer more competitive prices than its 
European rivals because of geographical location and technological 
advantage. After 1966, China was the second-largest market for Japanese 
steel exports, taking 7 per cent of total export, second only to the United 
states. The importance of the Chinese market increased as the growth 
:2 0 See Toda, Hiromoto (1977), "Ni tchu Tekko Boeki No Tenkai, 
(Development of Sino-Japanese Steel Trade)", in Sasamoto, Takeharu & 
Shimakura, Tamio (eds.), Ni tchu Boeki No Tenkai Katei (Development 
Process of Sino-Japanese Trade). Tokyo: Ajia Keizai Kenkyu-jo, 
pp.161-180; Saji, Ryuichi (1973), "Nitchu Tekko Boeki To Chugoku No 
Keizai Hatten (Sino-Japanese Steel Trade and China's Economic 
Development)" in Asia Keizai Kenkyu-jo (ed.) (1973), Chugoku No 
Boeki To Nitchu Boeki (China's Trade and Sino-Japanese Trade), 
Tokyo: Ajia Keizai Kenkyu-jo, pp.201-227; and Ni tchu Keizai Kyokai 
(1974), Nitchu Keizai Koryu No Genjo To Tenbo (Present Situation and 
Perspective of Sino-Japanese Economic Intercourses), Tokyo: Nitchu 
Keizai Kyokai, pp. 151-207 . 
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potential of the American market seemed very limited. 2 t For items such as 
seamless pipe, China was Japan's biggest customer. The Japanese steel 
industry saw China as a supplier of coal and iron ore as well as a consumer 
of steel. In 1958, Japanese steel delegates, headed by Yoshihiro Inayama, 
Managing Director of the Yawata Steel Corporation, signed a five-year 
compensation trade agreement. 22 Under the agreement, the Japanese side was 
to export steel goods to the value of £100 million stg., in return for the 
same value of coal, iron ore and other minerals. Although the agreement was 
cancelled because of a political incident which occurred the same year, the 
agreement itself proved that a highly interdependent relationship existed in 
Sino-Japanese steel-related trade. 23 
For the Japanese chemical industry, China was the most important 
fertiliser market.2 4 By the end of the 1960s, Japan was the third largest 
2 t Japan's steel industry began to adopt voluntary export 
restraints on its exports to the United States from 1969. 
2 2 
Life 
sha, 
See Inayama, Yoshihiro (1986), Hatashi No Tekko ShoRa-shi, (My 
and Steel Industry in ShoRa Era). Tokyo: Toyo Keizai Shinpo-
pp.100-115. 
2 3 Details of the political incident knoRn as "Nagasaki Flag 
Incident" Ras as folloRs . A right-Ring activist destroyed the 
Chinese National flag at an exhibition in Nagasaki in May 1958. The 
Japanese government punished him not for insulting national symbols 
but for destroying private property. The Chinese government was 
discontented with this treatment, and sought the apology from the 
Japanese government. But the Japanese government ignored China's 
complaints. As a resul t, China suspended economic exchange wi th 
Japan until 1960. This incident occurred at a time Rhen Sino-
Japanese political relations Rere disturbed by revision of the 
Japan-US Security Treaty. 
2 4 See Ozaki, Yukinori (1977), "Nitchu Hiryo Boeki No Tenkai 
(Development of Sino-Japanese Fertiliser Trade)" in Sasamoto , & 
Shimakura, (eds.), Q,Q.cit., pp . 181-209; Tanaka, Hideo (1973), 
"Nitchu Kagaku Hiryo Boeki No Suii Tenbo (Change and perspective in 
Sino-Japanese Chemical Fertiliser Trade)" in Ajia Keizai Kenku-jo 
(1973), Q,Q.cit., pp. 229-253; and Nitchu Keizai Kyokai, Q,Q.cit., 
pp.78-92, pp.230-262. 
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producer and the largest exporter of fertiliser in the world. Over half 
the fertiliser produced in Japan was sold in overseas markets. Of t his, more 
than half was shipped to China. As China used most of her arable l a nd 
extensively, she needed great amounts of fertiliser to achieve an increase In 
her agricultural production. China was the world's largest fertiliser 
importer during the decade. Japan provided about half Chinese fertiliser 
import requirements in spite of competition from European rivals. It is 
worth noting that Japan and China concluded a three-year contract, covering 
1965 to 1967, on the fertiliser trade. The stable supply of fertiliser 
benefitted both Japan and China. 
Table 4 also shows the trade balance between China and Japan. In 
general, trade imbalance between Japan and China was not significant during 
the 1960s. Bilateral trade remained in balance largely because it was based 
on a principle of barter trade from the beginning. 2 ' 
Sino-Australian Trade Structure 
The development of Sino-Australian trade was encouraged by wheat 
exports from Australia to China 26 
2 5 Unofficial trade agreements in the period between 1952 and 
1958 were based on barter trade. The pound sterling was used as 
currency unit. Details of the agreements were analysed in Hiraoka, 
QQ.cit., pp.190-217. 
2 6 See Reynol ds, John (1 96"'), "Recogni ti on by Trade: The 
Controversial Rheat Sales to China" in The Australian Outlook, 
Vol. 18, No.2, August 1964, pp.117-126j Kilczynski, J. (1966), "Sino-
Australian Trade, and Defence", in The Australian Outlook, Vol.20, 
No.2, August 1966, pp.154-167j Price, Leslie (1985), "The Kheat 
Trade with China" in Dunn, H. & Fung Edmund (eds.), Sino-Australian 
Relations the Record 1972-1985, Brisbane: Centre for the Study of 
Australian-Asian Relations, Griffi th Uni versi ty, pp.179-185j 
Albinski, QQ. cit., pp.283-301j and Fung & Hackerras, QQ. cit., 82-
117. 
25 
Among the Australian exports to China, wheat held the predominant 
share. (see Table 5) When the first contract was concluded in the financial 
year 1960/61, the value of sales amounted to two-thirds of Australian 
exports. The share increased gradually and reached over 90 per cent of 
exports in the second half of the 1960s. Sino-Australian trade would 
therefore have been negligible but for the wheat trade. Wool was the second 
most important export item during the decade, but the value of the wool 
trade decreased after 1965/66. other items like manufactured goods and 
minerals were rarely exported to China, mainly because the Australian 
government adopted strict export restrictions on China trade in strategic 
commodities. 27 
Compared to exports, the value of Australian imports from China was 
small. But the value increased steadily, and in 1969/70, it was four times 
that of 1960/61. The maJor import items were textiles and agricultural 
goods like cotton and linen piece goods, towels, bristles, tung oil and silk. 
(See Table 6) These items, though, were not indispensable to Australia, as 
other supply sources or substitute items could easily be found . 2 8 
Australian imports from China were not nearly as important to Australia as 
wheat imports were to China. 
The trade balance, shown in Table 7, was always tipped in Australia's 
favour because of the wheat deal. Without it, the balance would have even 
inclined in China's favour in the latter half of the 1960s. Reflecting the 
characteristics of the wheat deal, the value of the exports and the trade 
2 7 On Australia's export control on China trade, see Albinski , 
oc. ci t., pp.302-335; Rilczynski, QQ. ci t., pp.160-163; and Fung & 
Hackerras, Q..Q. ci t., pp.86-88. 
2 & Availability of import items from a third party Ras analysed 
in Rilczynski, QQ. ci t., p.158. 
TABLE 5 Commodity Composition of Australia's Exports to China. 1960/61-1969/70 
Rheat 
Rool 
Others 
TOTAL 
Rheat 
Rool 
Others 
TOTAL 
1960/61 
A$m 
50.8 
7.6 
21 . 3 
79. 7 
1965/66 
ASm 
% 
( 64) 
( 1 0) 
( 27) 
( 100) 
% 
100.4 (94) 
3.0 (3) 
3.1 (3) 
106.5 (100) 
1961/62 
A$m 
97. 5 
12 . 0 
22. 4 
131. 9 
1966/67 
ASm 
% 
( 74) 
( 9) 
( 1 7) 
( 100) 
% 
115.9 (90) 
7.6 (6) 
5.0 (4) 
128.5 (100) 
Source: Australian Bureau of Statistics Overseas Trade 
1962/63 
A$m 
105 . 5 
1 6. 8 
7.0 
129. 3 
1967/68 
ASm 
% 
( 82) 
( 1 3) 
( 5) 
( 100) 
% 
120.8 (95) 
3. 5 ( 3) 
2. 2 ( 2) 
126.5 (100) 
1963/64 
A$m 
1 28. 2 
23.6 
26. 4 
168. 2 
1968/69 
ASm 
% 
( 76) 
( 1 4) 
( 1 6) 
( 100) 
% 
58.4 (87) 
• 5. 9 ( 9) 
2. 9 ( 4) 
67.2 (100) 
1961/61 - 1969/70 
1964/65 
A$m 
11 5. 7 
12. 2 
7.7 
135.6 
1969/70 
ASm 
118. 3 
2.6 
4.9 
125. 8 
% 
( 85) 
( 9) 
( 6) 
( 100) 
% 
( 94) 
( 2) 
( 4) 
( 100) 
N 
0"1 
TABLE 6 Commodity CompositiQJL __ QX Australia's Importsui'T_ornChiJH11 1 960/61-1969/7 0 
1960/61 1961/62 1962/63 1963/64 19 64/65 
A$m % A$m % A$m % A$ % A$m % 
Agricultural Products 3. 26 ( 41) 2.49 ( 33) 3.20 ( 28) 4.04 ( 25) 5. 1 4 ( 22) 
Food 0.85 ( 11) 0.76 ( 1 0) O. 67 ( 6) O. 90 ( 6) 1 . 00 ( 5) 
Industrial Goods 3.82 ( 48) 4.00 ( 53) 6.58 ( 58) 11.89 ( 73) 16. 92 ( 74) 
Textile Goods 3.30 ( 42) 3.32 ( 44) 5. 82 ( 52) 9. 09 ( 56) 1 2. 40 ( 54) 
Others 0.86 ( 1 0) 1 . 1 2 ( 1 4) 1 . 47 ( 1 3) O. 41 ( 3) 0.79 ( 3) 
N 
--.J 
TOTAL 7.94 ( 100) 7. 62 ( 100) 11. 25 ( 100) 16. 35 ( 100) 22.86 ( 1 00) 
1965/66 1966/67 1967/68 1968/69 1969/70 
Agricultural Products 4.89 ( 21) 5. 57 ( 21) 3.36 ( 1 4) 4.28 ( 1 4 ) 4.40 ( 1 4 ) 
Food 1 . 98 ( 8) 2. 21 ( 8) 1 . 22 ( 5) 1. 65 ( 6) 1 . 61 ( 5) 
Industrial Goods 17. 82 ( 76) 19. 46 ( 74) 19. 1 8 ( 81) 24. 31 ( 82) 26. 49 ( 83) 
Textile Goods 11 . 89 ( 51) 13. 82 ( 53) 1 3. 99 ( 59) 18. 32 ( 62) 1 8 . 81 ( 59) 
Oth e rs O. 70 ( 3) 1 . 1 0 ( 4) 1 . 47 ( 4) 1 . 05 ( 4) 1 . 1 8 ( 4) 
TOTAL 23.46 (100) 26.14 (100) 23.59 (100) 29.65 (100) 32.08 (100) 
Source: Australian Bureau of Statistics Overseas Trade 1960/61-1969/70 
TABLE 7 The Val u e , S h are and B a 1 an ceo f Au s t r ali a' s T r a d e wi the htrLa l 1 960 / 6 1 - 1 969/ 70 
A B C D E F A/C 
Australia's A's Share Australia's C' s Share Australia's Trade 
Exports in Imports in Total China Balance 
to China Australia's from Australia's Trade 
Total China Total (A + C) (A - C) 
Exports ImpoJ:'ts 
N 
0" 
A$m % A$m % A$m A$m 
1960/61 79.7 4. 1 7. 9 o. 4 87.6 71. 8 10. 0 
1961/62 1 31 . 9 6. 1 7.6 o. 4 139. 5 1 24. 3 17. 3 
1962/63 129. 3 6.0 1 1 . 3 O. 5 1 40. 6 11 8. 0 11. 4 
1963/64 168 . 2 6. 0 1 6. 4 0.7 184. 6 1 51 . 8 10. 2 
1964/65 1 35. 6 5. 1 22. 9 O. 8 1 58. 5 11 2. 8 5. 9 
1965/66 1 06. 5 3. 9 23. 5 0.8 130. 0 81 . 3 4. 5 
1 966/67 1 28. 5 4. 2 26. 1 O. 9 1 54. 6 1 02. 3 4. 9 
1967/68 1 26. 5 4. 2 23.6 O. 7 1 50. 1 1 02. 9 5 . 3 
1968/69 67.2 2.0 29.6 0.9 96.9 37. 6 2. 2 
1969/70 125. 8 3. 0 32. 1 O. 8 1 57. 9 93 . 7 3. 9 
Source: Australian Bureau of Statistics, Overseas Trade 1960/61-1969/70 
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imbalance fluctuated significantly. The volume and price of wheat sales 
were conditioned by har/ests not only in Australia and China but also In 
other wheat-producing countries which supplied wheat to China. China was 
not concerned about the trade imbalance of the Sino-~ustralian trade, though 
this was often a problem in Sino-Japanese trade. Had China requested a 
principle of barter trade, the Sino-Australian trcde could not have 
worked. 29 That China did not care about tle trade imbalance suggests that 
the wheat deal was as important to China as to Australia. 
Australian wheat exports to China started in 1960. The first news 
that China wantLu to buy large amounts of wheat from Australia came to C.J. 
Perrett) General Manager of the Australian Wheat Board volho , at that time, was 
staying in Hong Kong on his way home after negotiating wheat sales with 
Japan ese customers in December 1960. The news surprised him because the 
Australian Wheat Board had received a negative answer from China when it 
asked about Chinese interest in wheat purchase five years before. He 
immediately signed a contract for the sale of 300)000 tonnes of wheat. The 
following year, h e concluded the sale of an additional 750,000 tonnes; This 
was the largest deal Australia had ever contracted with China. 3 0 
At that time wheat purchase was an urgent matter for China, as she 
was suffering from an wheat shortage caused by the failure of the ambitious 
economic development plan known as the "Great Leap Forward". China had 
2 9 Some contracts betHeen Australia and China Here based on 
barter trade. For example, in 1958, Heine Bros. exported steel to 
China in exchange for soybeans, grains, oils and other Chinese 
commodi ties. HOHever) the val ue of these barter trade deals Has 
feH, compared to the total bilateral trade figures. See Albinski, 
QQ. cit . , pp.260-261. 
3 0 See Reynolds, QQ.cit., pp.117-122 ; 
and Albinski, QQ. cit., pp.283-287. 
Price, QQ. ci t. , pp.180-181; 
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apparently overestimated the growth of her hea~y industrial sector and .u~ 
agricultural production aside under the plan. Successive n3tu~al disas~ ~S 
at the end of the fifties YJorsened the situation. As a resu~t, s le faced 2. •• 
uneypectedly bad harvest in 1 960. To worsen rna tters, China could no longer 
rely on the Soviet Union because of the pol~tical and i deologicnl split. ~he, 
thus, had to contact almost every other ~lheat e.=porting country, includ~~1'_ 
Australia, Canada, Argentina and France, Ylhether or not they recognised ,-e .. ', 
i n or der to r elieve her food shortage. C 1ina, hO~olever, did net con tact t:le 
United States, which was the largest wheat e;cporter Vlith immenst stocl(s of 
unsold wheat despite the urgency of the situation. 
The Chinese wheat purchase saved the Australian wheat prcd~cers too. 
At the beginning ef the 1960s, every principal wheat exporter, namely the 
United States, Canada, Australia, . rgentira and France, held huge stoc!~s of 
unsold wheat because of successive good harvests during the 1950s. 
Compet·.~ion among the wheat exporters had been intense. The wheat price 
fell to a record post-~ar low in the mid-fifties and improved v~ry littJe 
aftel. that. Under those circumstances, Aus~ralia had begun to lose her 
traditional wheat market . European countries, which were the most impo:,tan:: 
i mporters of Australian wheat , began to encourage domestic production in the 
place of imports. The United States penetrated other Australian markets, 
s uch as India, using its wheat surplus as a measure of economic aid. As a 
r esult , Aust r alia h ad to fi nd new markets, and China proved to be the most 
s ui tabl e ma rket f or Austral ia . The importance of the Chinese market 
i ncr eased especi ally when t he Uni ted Kingdom changed the Commonwealth 
preferential system in preparation for joi nin g the Eu r opean Economic 
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Community. J 1 Australia had benefitted greatly under the system, so t he 
change :orced Australia to pay more attention to her Asian neighbour~, lLc2 
China, at least i economIC terms. 
After the first wheat sale was implemented, China continued to impo~t 
enormous amounts of wheat from ustralia during the 19603. Nearly on~-
third of the wheat shipped from Australia went into the Chinese mar~e~. 
China was a reliable trade partner who always paid promptly. Due to the 
wheat deal with China, Australian wheat production and exports gre:-J rapid::'. 
Annual average wheat production during the early half of the 1960s was 
almost twice as large as that of the former five years increasing from 
4,578 kilo tonnes to 8,298 kilo tonnes. During the same period, . '-~<l nea l.. 
exports more than doubled, from 2,613 kilo tonnes to 6)048 kilo tonnes. 
Wheat sales to China, which grew from nil to 1 )997 kilo tonnes, accounted for 
54 per cent of the increase in production and 58 per cent of the increase in 
exports. 32 
Table 8 shows the sources 01 Chinese wheat imports during the 1960s . 
Australia held t e largest share in six out of these ten years. She en:cyeC 
this predominance maIn~y because the United StatES could not enter the 
market during the decade. 3 3 
----------- ----------
3 1 See Gelber, H. G. (1966) 
Ovford Uni versi ty Press; and 
Australia, HelbolJrne: Thomas Nelson. 
ritain 8. the EEC, Lond...,n: 
J. D_ B. (1976), The EEC a"1d 
3 2 Figures of Australia 's wheat production 
from Bureau of Agricultural Economics (1980)) 
Australian roduction, Exports, 
and exports were taken 
Historical Trends in 
Incomes and Prices_ 
3 3 Once the United States entered the Chinese wheat market, 
Australia's share declined. In 1980/81, China imported 13,223) 000 
tonnes of wheat. The United States held 64 per cent, Canada held 23 
per cent, and Australia held only 11 per cent. 
1960/61 
1 961/62 
1962/63 
1963/ 64 
1964/ 65 
1 965/66 
1966/67 
19 67/68 
1 968/69 
1969/70 
TABLE 8 Direction of China's Hheat Imports t 1 960/61-1969/70 
Australia Canada EEC Argentina Others 
[kilo t] ( %) [kilo t] ( %) [kilo t] ( %) [kilo t] ( %) (kilo tJ ( %) 
11 75 ( 60) 775 ( 40) 1 0 (1) 0 ( 0) 0 ( 0) 
1953 ( 41 ) 1 968 ( 41 ) 586 ( 1 2 ) 88 ( 2) 160 ( 3) 
2059 ( 42 ) 1 678 ( 3·1) 990 ( 1 4.) 98 ( 2 ) 46 ( 1 ) 
2543 ( 49 ) 1005 ( 1 9 ) 222 ( 4) 988 ( 1 9 ) 440 ( 8 ) 
2253 ( 45 ) 1758 ( 35) 399 ( 8) 599 ( 1 2) 45 (1) 
2107 ( 33) 2053 ( 32) 61 ( 1 ) 2241 ( 35) 0 ( 0) 
2163 ( 43) 2465 ( 49) 73 ( 1 ) 306 ( 6) 0 ( 0) 
241 6 ( 58) 1 367 ( 33) 363 ( 9) 1 0 ( 0) 0 ( 0) 
11 82 ( 33) 2127 ( 60) 254 ( 7) 0 ( 0) 0 ( 0) 
21<16 ( 49) 1830 ( 36) 764 ( 1 5) 0 ( 0) 0 ( 0) 
Source: International Wheat Council: "orid Wheat Statistics, 1963-1970 
Taken from: The Parliament of the Commonwealth of Australia, (1984) 
Australia-China Trade, Report from the Senate Standing Committee 
on Industry and Trade, p.41. 
Total 
[Kilo tJ 
1 960 
4746 
4871 
5198 
5054 
6372 
5007 
4156 
3563 
50~0 
w 
N 
33 
atic"':1s 
The previous chapter identified several factors which enceu-aged t~~ .e 
despite the absence of diplomatic relations. However, trade ~<olitho'lt 
diplomatic relations tend~ to be risky because of unstable political 
atmosphere. Business representatives involved In such trade usu~lly see~ 
measures to secure thei::-, business. So specia ti."ade ar:--angemc:!n t:> are us~ ~ .2.1y 
necessarJ to promote trade without diplomatic relations. 
This chapter explai.s such trade arr'an.gerne:l ts i:l Sino-Japa'1ese aLd 
Sino-Aust 'alian trade in the period eoncE4ned ani discusses insti~ut~onal an~ 
operat'onal aspects In the bilateral trade relations of both countrie~ . 
Sino-Japanese trade dU"" .'ng the 1960s was carried out through t-:o 
different chann91s. The fi- st was ItL-T T L~ade", based. en a long-t'? l"':-I . L~ u.r::~ 
greemer:t. The secon" was "Friendship Trade" ( t uko ~o'::ki \ carried ou t b,:/ 
hund eds of special China trade companies. Both illustrated th~ spec:al 
character of trade without diplomatic relations. 
"L-T Trade" 
"L-T Trade"was named from the initials of t e sIgners of a ~ong- :'2. , 
trade agreement, Liao Chengz, i, the first Chairrr:an of t~e China-Zap&n 
Fr' endship Society, and Tatsunosuke Takasa.zi, a mem er of the Liberal 
Democratic Party (LDP) and e'- inister for International Trade and Industry. 
The agreement was concluded in 1962, the same year Premier Zhou Enlai and 
Kenzo atsum' ra, a senior member of the LDP, negotiated full scale 
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resumption of Sino-Japanese trade. 1 Although Liao and Takasaki signed the 
agreement as individuals, both gover-nments endorsed it.2 So, the agreern~.,:::: 
had a quasi -of:icial character. 
This agreement was the first l01g-term trade agre~ment Slnce the 
beginning of Sino-Japanese trade. 3 It covered the period :rcm 19G3 to 
1967 . After the agreement expired, it was renewed year~y in the name c~ 
" l1emorandum Trade". 4 But the long-term character of t~e ag~eeme~-
disappeared after 1968. 
ttL-T Trade" dealt vlith the principal items of bilateral trade. Unde~ 
ttis agreement steel, fertiliser, agricultural medicine, ag:-icultural 
machinery and complete industrial plants were exported from Japan. China, 
Si nce 1 958, C ina had sus pended trade Hi th Ja pan beca lse of 
" Nag a sa ;{ i F I a gIn c ide n t " ( s e e not e 2 3 inC hap t e r I I) . Neg 0 t i a t ion s 
on resumption of Sino - Japanese trade took place tetrreen Matsumura 
and Zhou in Septel. ber 1962. " L- T Trade" AgL eement Has signed on 
9 November, 1962 . In reference to the negotiations on "L-T Trade·', 
see Kaza.-kai (ed . ), QQ. cit . , pp_214-216; Okazal<i,Kah<::ita (1975), 
" L. T. , M. T. Boeaki 0 Koto - Matsumura, Takasaki Sensei Ho 
S hi nob its u t s u (I n t·1 y Me m 0 r y 0 f M r r fat sum u r a and t-1 r T a k a s a k i i n 
Referenc_ wi th L. T. , 11 . T. Trade) " in 'Tihon Chugok ll ':.'"uko Kyokai 
( Sei to) ChuOH Houbu ( ed . ), QQ. ci t . , pp. 227-231; and Okazaki, Kahei ta 
(1 984), OHarinak· Nitchu I Tabi (Endless Journey betTieen Japan and 
China) , Hara Shobo, pp.184 - 188. 
2 On t h _ Ike d a Cab i net ' s corn mit r:l e n ~ to" L - T T r ad elf, see , t For e i g i1 
Minister Ohira's stateme. t at the Committee on Foreign Affairs, t~e 
House of Counsellors on 1 Hovember, 1962", in Asahi Simbun-sh3. (ed.) 
( 1972), Shiryo t ihon To Chucwku, 1945-71 (Sino-Japanese Relations 
Records : 1945-1971). Tokyo: Asahi Shimbun-sha, pp. 105-108. Ohi.ra 
admitted that the government Hould p omote "L-T Trade" to the same 
d egree as the European countries promoted their China trace . 
Pr eceding trade ag r eements covered only one year. Although 
th e 1 958 steel trade agreements covered five years, it Has not put 
into p r ac t i ce . 
4 It is sa i d t h a t China d id not Ran t t o use personal initials as 
a titl e of the t r a de agreeme n t_ See Kazan-kai (ed . ) QQ. cit., p.440 . 
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In return, exported soybean, maIze, rIce, beef, coal, Iron are, pig- iron, tin 
and salt. 
The value of the exports during the term was, in principle, the sc..me 
as that of imports. T.e principle of barter trade, acopted in past t.aJe 
ag:-eements, vIas basica_l~' ta en over under "L-T Trad ". The annual avere.<; 2 
of the total eyport and impo:-:: value uas temporarily negotiated at £36 
million stg. 
The volume and price of each individual iten were negotiated eve~y 
yea in Beijing between tne representatives of the respective Japane32 
industries and the related Chinese commercial orgonisations. This style 0_ 
ne:)otiat· en benef .:..tted Ja" an because individual Japanese companies cou_d 
afford to refrain f em any unnecessary competicicn among companies. The 
trading companies dealing with "L-T Trade" vlere &ppcintec. by th~ Japanes~. ~ 
Most of the Japalese exports were delivered o~ credit. The terms of 
the credit were fairly gen~rcus. For exampl-=, steEl rlas exported 0::1 the 
basis of two-years' credi L- \<liLh 5 per cent anrlu2.l in.terest. 6 
dea~ benefitted China strengthened the ccmpetitiveness o~ Japanese carnpanieJ 
against t 1eir Euro! ean ri?als. "L-T Trade" was intended to facilitate 
Ja,anes~ e:ports of comp_ete ·ndust ial plants whic~ China wanted to buy to 
acce erate her economic development. As the cost of comp_ete plants Kas 
extremely high,financia s pport by the Japanese govern~ent was necessary 
to r each this object. Kaheita Okazaki, \vho was an organlser 0 "L-T Trac.e") 
said he had received infcrma consent from the Ikeda Ca~~net for the use o~ 
5 itchu Keizai Kyokai, QQ. cit., pp.454-462. 
6 ibid, p.152; and Nihon Chugoku Kokl'o Xaifuku Sokushin Giin 
Renmei, (ed.), QQ. ci t., p.229. 
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official credit terms by the Export and Import Bank of Japan before he 
negotiated the trade contract with China.? However, only a . ngle plant 
was actually exported to China under this scheme because Lle Japanese 
government subsequently changed t e China trade policy in consideration of 
the relationship with Taiwan and the United states. Details of this policy 
change are discussed in the next chapter. 
Both sides established trade liaison offices in their partnerts cap:tal 
and the acti7ities of these offices went beyond promoting trade. For 
example, press correspondents were exchanged through these offices. 
Horeover) both sides promised protection and assistance to the other's 
correspondents. The offices may have functioned as quasi-consLlar of;ices, 
although the Japanese government officially denied this.8 
"F iendshiu Trad " 
"Friendship 'I'rade tt was a unique form of trade under special 
circumstances at a time when Japan and vhi~a had no diplomatic relat~o~s. 
In 1960) Premier Zhou Enlai laid out the conditions for Sino-Japanese traJ2. 
He insisted that a I economic agreements including trade, fishery and 
telecommunication were to be concluded by the governments, but he addeJ thac. 
trade between the peoples of both countries could proceed before th~ir 
7 Okazaki (1984)) QQ. ci t.) p. 185-187; and Ito) Takeo, 0 <azaki, 
Kahei ta & Matsumoto) Shigeharu (1983) Harera No Shoqai No Nal<a 'To 
Chugokl (China in Our Life), Tokyo: t1isuzu Shobo) pp . 214-218. 
Okazaki Has President of All Nippon AirHays at that time. He Has 
knoHn as a pro-Chinese businessman. 
8 See the memo r a ndum on exchanges of press correspondents 
betRee n Japan and Ch i na o n 19 April, 1964, in Kazan - kai (ed.), 
QQ. cit., p p. 233-234. I n r eference to the Japanese government t s 
on the function of t he L-T Trade liaison office, see Kazan-kai 
( e d.), QQ. ci t .) p. 23 9. 
view 
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governments concluded a trad agreement . T!1us, "Friendship Trade" bega.:;. o~ 
the basis of "people-to-people" trade. 9 
China acknowledged eligible trading companies based on 
recommendations by pro-Chinese organisa~ions in Japan such as Nippon 
Kokusai Boe.<i Sokushi!1 Kyo.<ai (the Japan In'cernationcl Trade Promotion 
Association) ar.d Nitc 11 Boeki Sr:;.(ushin-Kai (the Japan-China Trade Promoti:·n 
Association). These organisations were backed by the Japanese Sccialist 
Party o r the J apanese Communist Party.l 0 These trading companies wer~ 
called the "Friendly Firms" (y, ko ShoshaL The number of the companies uas 
estima ted at 27 0. Host 01 them .;ere small \'li th l,=ss than 10 million y~n of 
capital. As they gained their business mainly from the China trade, ~h ~ir 
activities were immensely inf luenced by the political atmosphere sU~Lounrtins 
the Sino-Japanese trade. t 1 Understandably, in order to get busin~ss, t1-'ey 
we:--e willing to accept the China's view of Sino-Japanese relations, that is 
th a t trade should be inseparable from politics. Noreo'ler, most of tr,em ~<1~r2 
members of the above mentioned pro-Chinese organisa~iGns . They ~oin~d 
political movements pLotesting the Jap&n-U3 military alliance and se2~in~ 
friendly relations wiL l China. "Friendly Firms", indeed, were r=olo tlca:" 
en ti ties. Th e y dealt with trade i tems other than those which wer~ SL~::'j<:!C: to 
9 Zhou Enlai presented a VleR on Sino-Japanese trade during an 
int ervieT{ HiLl Kazuo Suzuki, Director of Hitchu Soek:' Sol~ushir..-ka:_, 
on 27 Aug st) 1960. Zhou said: "If a certain Japanese private 
compa ny and a certain Chinese commercial organisation shaH good pill 
to wa rds o~e anotner). .. they can conclude trade contracts and carry 
them out. It See Kazan-kai (ed.) ) QQ. ci t.) pp.178-180; and l10rishi ta 
(ed. ), QQ. ci t., pp. 667-670. 
1 0 fippon 'okusai Boeki Sokushin Kyokai Has established on 22 
Septem be r) 195 4 . Nl tc u Boeki Sokushin-kai Has established on 4 
Hay, 1954, but it Has disbanded in August 19 56, caused by a split 
betHeen the Japanese Comm unist Party and the Chinese Communist 
Party. 
1 1 See Nitchu Keizai Kyokai, QQ. cit.) pp.470-472 . 
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"L-T Trade". any "Friendly Firms" joined the regular trade fairs held in 
Guangzhou to get business. Apart from overseas C inese the Japanese were 
the largest foreign participants at the fair. 1 2 Several Japanese 
establishe their own offices in Beijing to negotiate business directly with 
Chinese commercial organisations. They also organised and attended 
industrial exh~bitions held in two princi al c~ties in either country eve.J 
yea to introduce each country's economy ilnd culture and to sell the 
exhibi ts. 1 3 
The big Japanese trading companies were not greatly involved In Sino-
Japanese trade during this decade. lthough they paid attention to the 
Chinese mar 'et, they refrained from direct deals ~vith China. Some of them, 
instead, estaDli.shed affiliated companies, t e so-called "Dummy Firms" to dea~ 
wi th China. t 4 Big trading companies which were doing business allover 
the world could not afford to commit themselves to the policy of any 
particular country, especially one with w~ich Japan did not have diolomatic 
re.4aticns. Although busi. ess vlit.. Cnina was profita Ie, the gaIn f om t::-'cc:. · 
with China could net have compensated fo the poss:ble lOS3 if the Japa~es~ 
government or the United states had discriminated against the company. 
They, thus, refrained from direct commitment to C'lina b"'ade. 
1 2 Since 1957, China had held the "Guangz ou T_ade Fairs" every 
spring and autumn. This trade fai gave those Hho attended from 
overseas an opportunity to do business with China. 
t 3 The industrial exhibitions Rere held based on the "Agreement 
on Promotion 0 Sino-Japanese Friendship Trade", which Has concluded 
on 27 December, 1962. See azan-kai (ed.), QQ. ci t., pp.218-219. 
1 4 Most of the staff of the "Dummy Firms" Rere sent from their 
parent company. Activities of the "Dummy Firms" Rere supervised by 
their parent company. 
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",'S--:;: Trade" and t:-tFri~n 
Table 9 shows t. e sha:,e of "L-T Trade" and "Friendship Trede" lD 
total bilateral trade. When ttL-T Trade" started i.n 1963, it held 98 pe_" 
cent of Japanese exports, 33 per cent of imports and 63 per cent of tota: 
trade. Alt _oug~ ti"!e absolute value of "L-T Trade" increased until 196"", its 
stare in the total declined rapidly. By 1970) t!le " emorandum Trade" w'licn 
had taken over "L-T Trade" after 1968, held less than 1 0 per cen',: of the 
total trade. The decline of "L-T Trade" and " emorandum Trade" was r~lat2d 
to the deterioration of Sino-Japanese politica_ re!ations duri~g the lat~ 
1960s and the early 1970s. Details of this are discussed in the fou_ th e ... a 
the fifth chapters. 
.. anegeme • T ade 
In the case of Si~o- ustralian traje, there We~ nothing si~ilar to 
"L-T Trade" nor "Fr:endsh~p Trade". The H:lea:: Board monopolised Australia._ 
whea t sales to Cllina. Activities of the Board were supported and supe:,v:""3~'-
b:/ the _ ustralian govErnment, and t:1e ccmrrerci.al bargaining position 1:e:-'I,,=en 
t,.e Board and China in the period concerned fa?oured the Board. The whea ': 
trade ~la,-" in fact, success .. u_2.y inplemented w.:.thout any long-term 
agreeme~ts or guarantees from China. T ere was little trade in othe~ 
commod:ties because of the absence of effective pro7.otion measures. This 
section examines the way in wh':'ch the wheat trade was managed by the Hhe2t 
Board, and the problems in trade of other corrmodities. 
1963 
1964 
( L-T) 1965 
1966 
1967 
1 968 
1969 
( M-T) 1970 
1 971 
1972 
1973 
Table 9 Transition of " L-T Trcde" and "Friendship Trade. It 1963-1973 
Japan ' s Exports to China Japan's Imports from China Japan's Tot al Trade with China 
L-T (t1-T) Friendship Tr ade L-T (Ii-T) Friendship Trade L-T (11-T) 
US$m 
61 . 1 
74. 2 
87.0 
1 00. 1 
67. 5 
63. 4 
40. 6 
50. 0 
53. 7 
66. 9 
1 20. 5 
Soul~ce: 
( %) US$m ( %) US$m ( %) US$m ( %) 
(98.0) 1 . 2 ( 2. 0) 25. 0 ( 33.6) 49. 5 (66 . 3) 
( 48.6) 78. 5 (51.4) 40. 3 ( 25.6) 11 7. 4 (74.4) 
( 35.5) 157. 9 ( 64.5) 83. 5 (37.2) 1 41 . 1 (62.8) 
(31.8) 214. 9 (68.2) 104. 6 ( 34.2) 201 . 6 (65.8) 
( 23.4) 220. 7 (76.6) 84.. 3 (31.3) 1 85. 1 (68.7) 
(19.4) 262. 0 ( 80.6) 49. 9 (22.3) 1 74. 2 ( 77. 7) 
(10.4) 350 . 3 (89.6) 24. 4 (10.4) 21 O. 1 (89.6) 
( 8. 8) 518. 8 (91.2) 25. 8 (10.2) 228.0 (89.8) 
( 9. 3) 524. 4 (90.7) 31 . 0 ( 9. 6) 292. 1 (90.4) 
(11.0) 542. 0 (89.0) 31 . 9 ( 6 . 5) 459. 2 (93.5) 
(11.6) 918. 9 ( 88.4) 54. 5 ( 5. 6) 919. 5 (94.4) 
Japanese Ministry of Internationul Trade and Industry . 
Boeki Seisal<u (Trade Poliry)_, No.1 06. 
Hitchu Keizai Kyokai 
US$m 
86. 2 
11 4. 5 
170. 5 
204.. 7 
1 51 . 8 
11 3. 3 
65.0 
75.8 
84.7 
98. 8 
1 75. 0 
Nitchu Oboegaki No Juichi Hen (Eleven Years of Memorandum Trade) 
Taken from: Sasamoto & Shimakura (eds.) ( 1977)) QQ. ci t. I p.13. 
( %) 
(62.9) 
(36.9) 
( 36.3) 
( 33.4) 
( 27.2) 
(20.6) 
(10.4) 
( 9 . 3) 
( 9. 11) 
( 9. 0) 
( 8. 7) 
Friendship Trade 
US$m ( %) 
50. 7 (37.1) 
1 95. 9 (63.1) 
299. 1 (63.7) 
416. 6 (66.6) 
4.05.8 (72.8) 
<136. 2 (79.4) 
560. 5 (89.6) 
746. 8 (90.7) 
816. 5 (90.6) 
1,001.2 (91.0) 
1~8J8.4 (91.3) 
~ 
0 
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~ hea": Trad. 
The Australian Wheat Board monopolises Australian wheat market~ng. 
The Board is a statutory organisation based on the Hhea~ Ma ... keting Act. In 
accordance with the Act, the Board alone can undertake to buy all toe w !ea~ 
from Australian farmers 2l d sell it on the domestic an~ overseas markets, 
including C 1ina. There iu no t rading company lilhich r.:ediates in wheat t :::ide. 
As the single seller of Australian wheat, the Board could effective_y 
negotiate the terms of the contract with China during the 1960s. Using its 
world-wide network, the Board gathered details concernlng wheat trade all 
over the world and this strengthened its bargaining position. Negotiat:on3 
were held in Beijing every year following an invitation from Cnina. 
Although there was no guarancee of whether China would continu_ to buy 
Australian ~"heat, the Board vIas scarcely worried until 1970, presumably 
because it felt confident that it could offer the most aLtractive price to 
China. 1 ~ 
According to J. Wilczynski, the Board actually sold ~;Jheat to China E.t 
$.\ ~ .35 per bushel over the period between 1960 and 1965, a pric2 18 cen I~s 
lO'Jer than the Australian domestic cons'mption price, and 7 cents 10 J2::- tha[l 
t he export price to non-communist countries. This was partly because the 
wheat shipped to China was of lower quality. But even considering the 
quality t is price was still low. Subsidisation existed in the wheat trade 
wi th China. Hi czynski estimates th - t "the amount of subsidisa tion over the 
See Reynolds, QQ.. cit.; Rilczynski) 
and Albinski) QQ..cit., pp.283-301. 
QQ.cit.); Price) QQ..cit.; 
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period has been [was] in excess of $50 m, roughly equi valer- t to our 
[Australian] annua .... domestic wheat consumption." 1 6 
This subsidisation was facilitated by the Wheat Industry Stabilisatic~ 
Act. According to the Act, when international wheat prices fell below t: e 
domestic consumption price, calculated from the production cost, the gap C2.n 
be covered by expenses from t e Wheat Stabilisation Fund. If the Fund ha a 
deficit , the government could make up t..e loss. This mechanism strengt:1 _ned 
t he Board's bargaining power because it could set the w'1eat pric'9 belou t.1e 
production cost. 1 7 
I onically, it was China who wanted a long-term agreement as a 
measure of secu.ity in meeting her wheat demand. China also em9hasised 
she would continue to buy a certain amount of wheat from tustLalia under 
t he agreement no m tter how larg~ her _uture productio m~ght be. The 
Wheat Board, at that time, r'ejected the proposal becat:.se it would not he:re 
had enough in stoc r to meet its normal commitments to othe~ customers had 
it concluded a long-term agreement ~ith China. 1 8 
China would not end its wheat purc ase from Australia, whether or not a 
l ong - term ag eemen': Has concluded, ecause of the bargaining positions 0: 
both parties. 
Trade 
Ther e was no comprehensive trade agreement like the "L-T Trade" 
agreement between Australia and China, mainly because, apart from wheat, 
1 6 Rilczynski, QQ. cit., p . 1 6 2. 
1 7 Reynolds, QQ. c i t., pp . 119-12 0. 
1 8 Price, QQ. c i t. , p.181. 
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there were insufficient principal trade items to make a substantial trade 
agreement worthwhile. 1 9 
There were also few Australian companies doing business with China. 
As mentioned earlier, wheat trade was carried out without private 
participation. The number of other trading items were few because the 
Australian government adopted strict export control on strategic related 
items. The Australian private companies, thus, had little incentive to trade 
with China and station staff in Beijing. 
Information about the C. inese market was limited. No trade 
representative office was opened in China. The Australian Trade CommissicD2r 
in Hong Kong could not provide much information because his chaLce to 
tra vel around China was limited. 
No industrial e. hibition to in troduce each coun try's economy ,<las held 
during the 1960s. It was difficult to stage suc~ ex~ibitions because 0: the 
lack of interest and demand from the private sector . ~o 
Finally, the:--e was no pro-Chinese business entity like the "Friend_~ 
Firm" in Australia. Strong popular movements protesting the gover:1mer: ·:'s 
foreign policy and seecing friendly relations with China were scarcely 
observed in Australian business circles. In fact, anti-China sentiments still 
dominated at that time. Under the circumsta:1ces, L"ina did not think h':'ghly 
of the pri va te sector's role in Australia. Hhile Chinese leaders Ii <e fao 
Zedong and Zhou Enlai sometimes met representatives of the Japa~ese private 
1 9 The first long-term (3 years) wheat trade agreement between 
Australiaand China was signed in January 1979. 
2 0 The first Australian Trade Exhibition was held in Beijing in 
October 1974. China, in return, staged the Chinese Economic and 
Trade Exhibition in Sydney, in the same month. 
44 
sector, this did not happen in the Sino- Australian rela t ion s h ip. 2 1 I t was 
hard to find the essential conditions which might h ave c rea t ed s omething 
like a "Friendly Firm" in Australia. 
2 1 The Australian Trade Commissioner in Hong Kong, H. C. Henzies, 
visited Beijing in 1956. He met several high ranking Chinese 
officials including Zhou Enlai. But he was not a representative of 
t he Australian private sector. See Albinski, QQ. cit., p.270. 
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C apter IV: lnvol/ef:1ent of Governmen S In Trade r .-thout Diploma'-ic 
Relations_ 
Sino-Japanese and Sino-Australian trade during the 1960s demonstrated 
that trade can be maintained despite the absence o~ dip~omatic relations_ It 
also illustrated that there were limitations on trade because of the absence 
of diplomatic relations and because of political influences on trade_ 
This chapter focuses on the attitude of governments towards trade and 
the influence of politics on trade_ The fOrst part discusses the Japanese 
and the Chinese governments' attitudes towards Sino-Japanese trade, and the 
Australian and the Chinese governments' attitudes tO~.jarC:3 Sino-.. lstralian 
tradeo The second deals with the issue of financial sup~ort illustrating 
limitations on trade promotion by the Japanese and the Australian 
governments_ 
The Ja a Ese Cove ment and Si 0- apanese Trade 
Althoug the Japanese government, in principle, stressed that trade 
issues s.10uld be separated from political issues, it preferred "L-T Trade" to 
"Friends ip Trade" for political reasons_ Considerable difference existed. 
between the Japanese government's attitude towards "L-T Trade" and its 
attitude toward,:, "Friends ip Trade"_ The government enccuraged some membe~ s 
of the LDP to conclude the "L-T T ade" ag_ eement, and Prime Minister Ikeda 
appreciate efforts by atsumura and Ta. asaki to conclude this agreemen l:::_ 1 
Although his successor, Eisa u Sato, hesitated to permit an extension of 
supplier's credit to the export of industrial plants, he d~j not interfere 
1 
trade, 
Ikeda, 
In reference to Prime Hinister Ikeda's vieR on Sino-Japanese 
see Ito, Hasaya (1966), Ikeda Hayato Sono Sei To Shi (Hayato 
His Life and Death), Tokyo: Shiseido, pp_ 174-1780 
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with other exports and imports bas2d on the "L-T Trade" agreement. After 
t is agreement had expired, the Sato Cabinet did not object to extending it, 
although the ne r,.; agreement ¥JaS not on a long-term basis. However, the 
government treated "Friendship Trade" ~<1ith indifference and sometimes 
intervened it. It sometimes delayed and refused to issue visas for Chinese 
delegates invited by pro-Chinese trade organisations. In some cases, the 
government did not permit the display or sale of several exhibits at tr3de 
fairs in China sponsored by "Friendly Firmsft. As a result, the Japanese 
Industrial Ex. ibition, which was to be held in Shanghai in 1969, was 
cancelled. 2 
Why was there such a difference? First of all, it was related 'co the 
poli tical character of "L-T Trade" and "Friendship Tradelt . "L-T Trade" was 
organised by members of the Liberal Democratic Party, while "Friendshi? 
Trade" was supported by the Japanese Socialist Party, and, at the initial 
stage, by the ,Japanese Communist Party. ItFriendly Firms", ~'lhich were 
engcged in "Friendship Trade", opposed the China trade policy of the 
Japanese government, in particular, and the Japan-US military alliance) In 
general. Additionally, the Chinese government, clearly appreciated the 
ccti vi ties of the "Friendly Firmslt. 3 The Japanese government rega_ded the 
"Friendly F':'rms" as anti-government organs encouraged. by China, although 
the government did not deny the necessity of Sino-Japanese trade by means 
2 On the Japanese government's interference Rith the "Friendship 
Trade", see Ni hon Chugoku Yuko Kyokai (Sei to) ChUOR Honbu (ed.), 
QQ. cit. , pp.144-152. 
:3 For example) China stated in the Agreement on Promotion of 
Sino-Japanese "Friendship Trade": "The Chinese side deeply 
appreciated the fact that Japanese relevant [pro-Chinese] 
organisations and persons Rho sought to expand Sino-Japanese trade 
had alRays struggled for the promotion of Sino-Japanese trade under 
the difficult condition." See Kazan-kai (ed.) QQ. cit., pp.218-219. 
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of " .. riendship Trade". In addit.ion to political factors, the governmen:: paid 
more attention to "L-T Trade" than "Friendship Trade" for econcmic reasons. 
E. port commodities covered by "L-T Trade" were principally heavy and 
c emical industrial gocds. As the general trade policy of the government 
then was oriented forwards the promotion and export of heavy and chemical 
industrial goods, "L-T Trade" was preferred as it was consistent with t e 
government's trade policy. 
The Chinese Government and S~no-Japanese Trade. 
The Chinese government continually criticised the Japanese 
government's posture towards Sino-Japanese trade. It stressed at eve y 
opportunity that trade should be inseparable from politics and that the 
bilateral trade could develo. only when political relations were improved. 
Com'7lenting on the Japanese government's posture, Chen Yi, Chi a's Foreign 
M~nister, mentioned that the Japanese government had pretended to promote 
bilateral trade while ma'ntaining its anti-Chinese political postu~e.4 
Alt oug. China, ~n principle, required consistency in t ad=: and -politics, s.e 
took a flexible or pragmat:c apprcach in practice, and d~d not stop trade 
wit Japan during the 1960s. She supported "Friendship Trade" on the basis 
of "people-to-people" t ade and also considered "L-T Trade" important, at 
least initially. It thus appeared as if C ina, and not Japan, separated La e 
from politics although official statements contradicted this. 
How can the Chinese attitude towards Sino-Japanese trade be explained? 
China supported "F:,iendship Trade", which was backed by the Japanese 
"Intervie .... ith Foreign Minister 
director of Tokyo Broadcasting System, 
kai (ed.), QQ. cit., pp.234-238. 
Chen Yi by Hashimoto, a 
on 18 June, 1964" in Kazan-
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Socialist Party (JSP). The Chinese government and the Chinese Communist 
Party maintained comfortable relations with the JSP and held regular 
meetings almost every year from the late 1950s. 5 Asanuma, Chairman 0: t e 
JSP, stated in China in 1959 that US imperialism was a common enemy of both 
the Japanese and Chinese people. 6 This view of international politics 
agreed with the Chinese government's vie 1 of the time. oreover, all the 
"Friendly Firms" accepted the Chinese view in 0 der to do business vlith 
China. That explained why China could insist on her political stance 
towards bilateral trade without fearing any detrimental effects on 
"Friendship Trade". Clearly, China had to stress her political position to 
encourage the activities of the JSP and "Friendly Firms". 
Why did China continue "L-T Trade" which was organised by some 
members of the Government Party? In this regard, it seems that there was a 
contradiction between principle and practice. While China criticised tne 
Japanese government, she kept in contact with the Liberal Democratic Party 
(LDP). This was partly due to the economic interest which "L-T Trade" served 
for China. It also related to the political situation in Japan. Afte a mass 
movement protesting the Japan-US alliance subsided, China might have 
thought that the JSP would not take over the government in the near future. 
It was thus strategic for China to establish channels of communication witn 
the LDP to p epare ~or any future policy changes within the LDP. Howeve~, 
as political confrontation between the governments intensified in the later 
The Japan Socialist Party had regular contact not directly 
Rith the Chinese Communist Party, but Rith the Chinese People's 
Institute of Foreign Affairs. HORever, representatives of the JSP 
usually met Mao Zedong and Zhou Enlai Rhen they visited Beijing. The 
Japanese Communist Party, on the other hand, kept direct 
r elationship Rith the Chinese Communist Party until 1966. 
b 
" Inajiro Asanuma's address in Beijing on 12 March, 
Asahi Simbun-sha (ed.) (1972), QQ.cit., pp.176-178. 
1959" in 
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half of the 1960s, China did not expect any improvement of bilateral 
relations under the Sato Cabinet. 7 As a result, the value of "L-T Trade" In 
the total bilateral trade declined. China's opinion about the relationship 
between trade and politics was reflected In the e;'perience with "L-T Trade". 
(See Table 9) 
Government and Sino- ust~alian Trace 
The Australian government clearly distinguished between exports of 
strategic items and those of non-strategic commodities like wheat and wool. 
Apart from the United States, which had no trade relations with China, 
Australia maintained the broadest range of export controls on strategic 
items directed against China of any Western country. Although the European 
countries and Japan extended export controls on trade with China to almost 
the sam degree as those applied to other Communis t countries, Australia rept 
the so-called "China Differential". 8 However, concerning export of non-
strategic items) the government did not openly interfere with trade, and In 
fact promoted it In varIous ways. For example, the govern men t did not 
refuse the issue of passports or visas for Australian and Chinese business 
rep esentatives. It allowed the Australian trade commissioner to travel 
7 On Sino-Japanese political confrontation during the late 
1960s, see Clark, Gregory (1971) ItSino-Japanese Relations - An 
Analysis" in The Australian Outlook, Vol. 25, No.1, April 1971, 
pp.58-68; and Sasamoto, Takeharu (1977), "Nitchu Boeki No Teitai To 
Tenkai,; (Sino-Japanese Trade) Its Halt and Development)" In 
Sasamoto & Shimakura (eds.) (1977) QQ. ci t., pp.19-21. 
8 See Hilczynski) QQ. ci t. , pp. 160-163; Fung & Hackerras, QQ. ci t. ) 
pp . 86-88; and Albinski, QQ. cit., 302-335. Albinski also published 
the relevant article on The Australian Outlook: "Australia and the 
Chinese Strategic Embargo" (1965), The Australian Outlook, Vol. 19) 
No.2) August 1965, pp.117-128. Much of the materials in this 
a r ticle is draHn from his above mentioned book. 
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around China to gather information about the Chinese rna_ket and supported 
the activities of the Wheat Board and the Wool Corporation. 
Australia \<las committed to t. e United states' China containment 
strategy in a political and military sense. From the start, Australia 'oined 
the South East Asia Treaty Organisation (SE~TO) which aimed at a CG lec~ive 
defence against aggression from Chinese Communism. In accordance with the 
Treaty, she sent military advisers to South ~lietnam, and elso fought battl~s 
at the war front in Vietnam. 9 The Australian government was thus 
sensitive to exporting strategic items to China which might strengthen 
Chinese or North Vietnamese military ability. 
Australian exports then consisted mainly of non-strategic or 
agricultural commodities. During the first half cf the 19603, the total 
value of Australia's agricultural-related exports came to nearly three-
quarters of her total export . Wheat, together wit wool and meat, were the 
most important sources 0; foreign currency. ustralian trace policy was 
oriented towards promoting export of these commodities.! 0 In addition, the 
position of Hiniste for Trade, later Minister for Trade and Primary 
Industry, was filled by the leader of the Country Party, John Mc~weZ!, a G. 
later Doug Anthony. As the party's name suggests, the Country Party 
9 
"Austral ia , as a SEATO membe , and also as a close ally of the 
US Has requested to supply forces (to V~etnamJ. In 1962 a smal: 
army contingent Has sent to Vietnam ... and in 1965 the Menzies 
governme t announced the commitment OL a battallion to South 
Vietna. At tie height of the Har the Australian presence in 
Vietnam numbered some 8, 000 and by April 1970 Australian casualties 
in the conflict amou .ted to 400 dead and 2,500 Hounded." Quoted 
from Jaensch, Dean 8. Teichmann, Max (1984), The Macmillan D' ctionary 
of Australian Politics, (Second Edition), Melbourne: Macmillan, 
p.207, (First Edition, 1979). 
1 0 Bureau of Agricultural Economics, .QQ. cit., Table 3 "Exports 
and Imports: Australia", and Table 7, "Value of Exports of 
Agricultural Origin." 
- --
51 
represented the interest s of farmers, so the interest s of t he rural secto_ 
influenced Australian trade policy then. As ea rlier mentioned, China was the 
most important market for Australian w: eat, and it was a l mos t i mpossible to 
find an alternative market as large as China. Under t hose circumstances, t~e 
government could scarcely ignore the interests of wheat growers. 
I Perhaps the purpose of the Australian trade policy was to promote r.o ·,:: 
China trade, in particular, but her own agricultural e~{ports, in genera . 
The Wheat Industry Stabilisation System had been introduced t welve years 
before Australia began to sell wheat to China. 1 1 It was the Wh eat Board 
and not the government that decided the direction of wheat sales . However, 
the government could have stopped wheat export to China, as was t he casa 
with strategic items, or at least advise the Board to reduce the export if 
the government had considered the China wheat deal undesirable. Bu t the 
government preferred to support rather than objected to the activities of 
the Board. Thus, the government promoted the wheat trade with China 
although it did not involve itself directly. 
Trade 
The Australian government's political stance towarcs China resembled 
that of the Japanese government which was seen by China as a hcstile 
posture against her.l 2 However, concerning Sino-Austra lian trade, Chi na 
rarely required the Australian government to change its anti-Chinese 
1 1 The Hheat Indust y Stabilisation System was introduced in 
194 8. 
1 2 For example, Australia sent her troops to Vietnam in line Rith 
America's China containment policy; Australia opposed to China's 
members hip at the United States; and Australia recognised the 
Nationa list government in Taipei instead of the Communist government 
in Beijing. 
52 
political stance In order to develop bilateral trade. According to repo:--ts, 
Zhou Enlai once mentioned that Australia would have to withdraw her troops 
from Vietnam if she wanted to continue wheat sales to China. But these 
remarks were directed to Japanese business representatives and not directly 
to Australian government officials or private business representatives.i 3 
When the Australian government refused to endorse the wheat credit sa~e, 
China did not criticise this action, so it seems that political confrontation 
between the governments influence the bilateral trade relationship only 
marginally. 
How can the Chinese attitude towards Sino-Australian trade be 
explained? As earlier mentioned, wheat trade had an overwhelming share In 
bilateral trade and the Australian government promoted the wheat deal by 
supporting the Wheat Board. Had China mixed bilateral trade with politics, 
it would have caused significant damage to the wheat supply. The Australian 
government might have stopped or decreased wheat export to China if China 
had openly criticised the government for its political stance in relation to 
trade. 1 4 China intentionally avoided mixing political matters with the 
wheat trade from which she gained essential benefit. 
In addition, the Australian Labor~ Party (ALP) was less enthusiastic 
about the wheat deal than was the government. The ALP proposed recognition 
---_._----------_._ .... _--_ .. _-_._. 
1 3 
Fun g & Mackerras, QQ. ci t., p.94; and Kennedy, D. E. "Australian 
Pol icy To H a r d s Chi n a, 1 9 6 1 -1 9 6 5 ", i n G r e en;, 0 0 d , Go r don & H a r per, 
Norman (eds.), Australia in Horld Affairs, 1961-1965, Melbourne: 
F. H. Cheshire, P.408. Zhou's remarks Here made in 1965. 
1 4 
Australia, in fact, considered suspension of Hheat exports to 
China for political reason. In 1967 the Australian government 
warned China that Australia might suspend wheat sales to China if 
China did not call off the riots in Hong Kong. See Andrews, 
QQ. ci t.) p.198; and Fi tzGerald, Stephen (1972), Talking wi th China, 
Contemporary China Paper, No.4, Canberra: Australian National 
Uni versi ty Press, p. 13. 
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of China in order to facilitate bilateral trade) but) before t he end of the 
1960s) this recognition was based on the "two-China" policy ) wh ich neithe~ 
Beijing nor Taipei accepted. Moreover) the ALP clearly suppor-ced t e 
Australia-US alliance. In this sense) the ALP's fore ign policy was n ot 
consistent with that of China. The relationship between China an d t he ALP 
was not as close as the relationship between China and the Japan ese 
Socialist Party (JSP). China could not find support in Australia f or her 
views on bilateral trade and politics) as she found from the JSP i n J apan . t 5 
Financial Support to Trade 
Although "L-T Trade" between Japan and China and the ~'lheat trade 
from Australia to China were relatively well-managed, promotion of tr ade 
with China by the Japanese and Australian governments was limited. Both 
governments did not involve themselves directly in trade with China. Th e 
issue of financial support from official agencies demonstrated these 
attitudes. The Japanese government cancelled its initial decision to exten d 
supplier's crecit f om the Export-Import Bank for exports of industr i a l 
plants to China. The Australian government kept the Export Paymen t 
Insurance Corporation from underwriting insurance on wheat credit sales t o 
China. Both governments presumably considered that official financ i al 
support might have a negative influence on their relations with oth er 
countries) such as the United states) as well as on their own poli tical stance 
towards China, and) therefore) a voided direct commi tmen t to China tra de. 
Each case deserves to be looked at in more detail. 
In ref erence to the ALP's China policy during the 1960s, see 
Fung 8. Mackerras, op. ci t.) pp. 95-106; and AndreRs, op. ci t.) p.195 
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Japa ndustrial Pant Exporta 
One of the maIn purposes of "L-T Trade" was to facilitate Japan's long-term 
credit exports, such as industrial plants, to China. 
Since the export of industrial plant often incurred huge costs, too~ a 
long time and was sometimes accompanied by large risk, export finance by the 
Ex-1m Ban l , was necessary to its realisation. The Japanese government, In 
fact, permitted the export credit for the first chemical fibre plant, 
explaining that the credit did not aIm to give China economic aid but 
promote Japanese exports, and that the Ex-1m Bank did not finance the 
Chinese government but Japanese exporter. It also explained that the terms 
of credit were not concessional compared to the conditions that Japan 
applied to underdeveloped countries. 1 6 But, the United States and Tai\<12.n 
condemned Japan for extending credit at a concessional interest rate as it 
meant that Japan was giving economic aid to China. 1 7 Protests from 
Washington and Taipei eventually forced the Japanese government to abandon 
credit e tention from the Ex-1m Bank. As a result, three existing contracts 
that had already been concluded on the condition that the Ex-1m Bank \~culd 
extend credit were cancelled, and until Japan recognised China, no industrial 
1 6 The Ikeda Cabinet decided to permit the export credit on 20 
August,1963. See Takahashi & Tanaka, QQ. ci t., pp. 180-181. 
1 7 In reference to the American criticism against Japan's 
industrial plant export to China, see ibid., pp.180-181. 
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plant could be exported to China. 1 8 Hence, the "L-T Trade", itself, came to 
a halt.19 
Why did the Japanese government hesitate to extend export credit to 
China trade? Clearly the government had to consider its negative efnect on 
the Japan-US relationship. The most important political issue between both 
countries at that time was negotiating the return of administrative rights 
over Okinawa to Japan. Japan lacked bargaining power with the United 
States. Escalation of the war in the Indo-Chinese Peninsular intensified 
political conflict between the United States and China. Okinawa was being 
used by the United States as an important forward military base. Under the 
circumstances, Japan had to support America's Asian Strategy, which was ba sed 
on the containment of China, to accelerate negotiations about Okinawa. 2o 
Thus, the Japanese government refrained from further commitment to wards 
China trade. 
Prime Minister Sato, together with his brother, ex-Prime Hinister ;{ishi, 
were known as leading pro-Taiwanese politicians. Pro-Taiwanese politicia r: s 
were dominant in the Liberal Democratic Party then, and their support was 
important as it enabled Sato to maintain power in his party for over s even 
1 8 See ibid, pp.176-193; and Ito, Okazaki & Matsumoto, QQ. cit., 
pp. 215-227, pp.235-242. On China's cri ticism against Japan's 
rejection of the export credit, see "The Sato Cabinet should repeal 
the' Yoshida Letter': an article on the People's Daily on 
12 February, 1965" in Kazan-kai (ed.), QQ. ci t ., pp.251-253. 
1 9 See Table 9. 
2 0 On Sa to' s commitment to America's Asian Strategy, to see "the 
Joint Communique between Prime Minister Sato and President Johnson 
on 15 November, 1967" and "the Joint Communique between Prime 
Hinister Sato and President Nixon on 21 November, 1969" in Asahi 
Shimbun-sha (ed.), (1972), QQ. ci t. I pp.203-204, pp.207-208. 
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years. Sato, therefore, could not neglect Taiwan's complaint about Japan's 
official financial support for China trade. 2 1 
In addition, Japan did not have diplomatic relations with China while 
most of her rivals such as the United Kingdom, France and the Netherlands, 
had already recognised China. West Germany, however , did not recognise 
China, but at the same time had no serious political differences with 
China. 22 Although Japan's political position was different from that of 
European countries, the two plants, which Japanese compan':'es had won 
contracts for, were the most expensive of those contracted by China with 
Japanese and European companies during 1963 and 1965. The five-year terms 
of credit was the longest given during this period. 2 3 Consequently, t~le 
Japanese contracts attracted America's and Taiwan's attention. Taking account 
of this, Sato confirmed that Japan could not conduct her affairs with China 
In the same way as the European countries because of her sensitive position 
with China . 2 4 
Furthermore, the supply of industrial plants helped China's economIC 
development whether the deal was implemented on a commercial or non-
concessional basis. Such exports were likely to upset the United States and 
2 1 In 1965, t he Japanese government provided "yen loan" to TaiH'an 
val ued at 54 bil lion yen (US$ 150million) . On 7 Septem ber , 19 67, 
Prime Minister Sato himself visi ted Taipei. 
22 The United Kingdom and Netherlands recognised China in 1950, 
Franc e recognised China in 1964. West Germany did not joint the 
United Nations at that time. Therefore, Rest Germany did not commit 
herself to the anti-China decision at the United Nations . 
2 3 Ministry of Internationa l Trade and Industry, 
Hakusho (Rhi te Paper on Trade) , p.638. 
( 1966), Tsusho 
2 " "Prime Minister Sato's statement at the 
the House of Councellors on 19 July, 1966" in 
(1972), Q,Q.cit., p.111-112. 
Committee on Finance, 
Asahi Simbun-sha (ed.) 
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Taiwan more than ordinary commodities. The Japanese government had 
presumably considered the immense political impact of the export of 
industrial plants in the United states or Taiwan when it decided not to 
extend official credit for this purpose. 
Australia' heat Credit Sales 
Except for the first contract, wheat was sold on one-year credit. The 
Wheat Board accepted the short-term credit deal at its own risk. When China 
wanted Australia to extend the term of credit to one-and-a-half years, as 
was the case with Canada and France, the Board asked the government whether 
the Export Payment Insurance Corporation, an official organisation, could 
underwrite the insurance. But the government declined, and the Board 
refused the China's request. 2 ~ 
The Australian government may have declined because it, like Japan, 
concerned about the negative effect on Australia's relationship with the 
United states. Although the United states was the largest wheat exporter I n 
the world, she did not enter the Chinese market because of her total trade 
embargo against China. Certainly the United states would have opposed about 
Australia's wheat sale to China, as it would weaken the effect of economic 
sanctions. The Australian government, thus, refrained from direct commit n en t 
to the China trade considering its relations with the United states. 
Another reason for the Australian government's refusal of financial 
support was partly because of the Australian domestic political situation. 
As the Government Parties (the Liberal Party and the Country Party) held a 
marginal majority of federal parliamentary seats, support from the 
2 5 Albinski, QQ. ci t., pp. 288-301. 
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Democra tic Labor Party was importan t, especially at election time, in order to 
retain control. 2 6 If the government had endorsed the wheat credit sale, it 
would have looked weak, and consequently might have lost the support of the 
Democratic Labor Party as well as the right-wing faction of the Government 
Parties. 
The Australian government's refusal to endorse the sale of wheat to 
China on credit terms demonstrated limits on trade promotion. But the 
negative effects on actual wheat sales were relatively small. Although 
export Insurance was important to secure a large wheat deal, it was not 
always indispensable. Since China had always settled payment promptly, there 
was little likelihood that the official money would be actually be needed 
for compensation In case of default. The wheat sale on one-year credit was, 
In fact, managed without export insuran ce. The government r efused to 
endorse the credit sale expecting t nat the refusal wou ld not influence 
future wheat sales greatly because of Australia's commercial bargaining 
position with China. When Australia declined to Cnina's request for 
extension of credit term, China withdrew her initial request and continued to 
buy wheat from Australia on a one-year credit. 
As for its relationship with the United States, the Australian 
government did not have to make a further concession to the United States, 
as Australia could justify her wheat sales to China as long as the 
government refrained from direct commitment to export. This was because 
strategically, wheat was not as important as steel, machinery or industrial 
2 6 Australia has a "preferential voting system". Although the 
Democratic Labor Party gained less than 10% of the total first 
preference votes during the 1960s, the DLP's supporters' second 
preference votes Here important for the Liberal-Country coalition 
to remain in government. 
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plants; the United states herself exported great amounts of wheat to the 
Soviet Union. In addition, Canada, which, like Australia, had not recognised 
China, a_so exported wheat to China. Although Canada was more dependent on 
the United States than was Australia economically and strategically, she had 
already concluded a long-term wheat sales agreement and a one-and-a-half 
years credit sale contract with China, neither of which Australia had 
concluded. The Australian government could thus have referred to Canada's 
trade involvement with China when asked by the United states to reduce its 
wheat sales to China. 27 Hence, Australia could continue to sell wheat to 
China without fear of reproach from the United States. 
2 7 In reference to America's complaints about Sino-Canadian 
trade, see Albinski, QQ. ci t., pp. 310-311. 
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C apter V: The Chang~ In In ernatio al Environ enu and T.l~S nfluence on 
Bilateral Trade 
Since the "Cold War" had conditioned Sino-Japanese and Sino-Australia 1 
political and economic relations during the 1960s, a dramatic change in the 
international political environment from the late 1960s to the early 1970s 
significantly influenced Sino-Japanese and Sino-Australian trade at the time. 
The Sino-American rapp ochement, which put an end to the "Cold War", 
strengthened China's bargaining powe in her negotiations vlith Japan and 
Australia. China began to consider establishment of diplomatic relations 
more important than trade in her relations with Japa and Australia. She 
required Japan and Australia to change their political attitudes to enable 
the establishment of diplomatic relations. So) she attempted to use trade as 
an instrument to achieve this change. In the case of Sino-Japanese trade, 
China requ i red Japanese big business to accept her political views to 
continue trading with her and in the case of Sino-Australian trade, China 
suspended wheat purchases from Australia until the bilate~al political 
relations improved. These Chinese actions caused fundamental changes in 
Sino-Japanese and Sino-Australian trade relat·ons. 
This chapter focuses on the change in the international political 
environment and its influence on Sino-Japanese and Sino-Australian trade 
relations. The following issues are exam'ned: a change in the international 
environment surrounding Japan, Australia and China; Japanese big business's 
entry into the "Friendship Trade"; China's suspension of wheat purchases from 
Australia; and transformation in Sino-Japanese and Sino-Australian trade. 
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T==h~e~C~h~a~n~g~e~~~t~e~I~n~t;e~r=n=a~t~ional Environment 
Sino-American rapprochment had a great impact on Sino-Japanese and 
Sino-Australian relations. Although the announcement of President Nixon's 
visit to Beijing caused a sensation allover the world, some movement had 
already started a few years before. As soon as Nixon was elected to the 
presidency, Washington began to review its Asian strategy to try to find an 
honourable way to withdra4 American troops from Indo-China. As the 1969 
Guam Doctrine implied, the United States abandoned her previous view that 
conflicts in Indo-China were main~y caused by aggression from Chinese 
Communism and decided to withdraw most of her troops from the region. In 
the same year, the United States eased its trade embargo on China and 
permitted American citizens to trave~ there. And in 1971, Washington 
announced that it would further ease its trade embargo. t 
Parallel to the American movement, China also changed her diplomatic 
stance. After overcoming the domestic conflict caused by the Cultural 
Revolution, she turned to external affairs. Ever since the Sino-Soviet split 
had escalated to a military conflict in 1969, China had co sidered the Soviet 
Union more dangerous than the United States and other capitalist countries. 2 
t President Nixon announced the "G uam Doctorine on 25 June, 
1 969. Rashington re laxed control on imports from China and on 
American ci tizens' travel to China on 27 July, 1969. Nixon 
announced further relaxation of trade embargo on 14 April, 1971. 
Nixon announced his visi t to Beijing on 15 July, 1971. Nixon 
visited China and announced the "Shanghai Communique on 26 February, 
1 972. In reference to America's review on its Asian strategy, see 
Van Ness, Peter "Richard Nixon, the Vietnam Rar, and the American 
Accommodation with China", a paper distributed at a seminar in the 
Department of International Relations, Australian National 
University on 3 April, 19 86. 
2 Chinese and Soviet soldiers exchanged fire in Damansky Island 
on Sino-Soviet border on 2 March, 1969. 
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Canada recogn:.sed China on 13 October, 
on 6 ,1o'lellbe r, 1970. 
197 . Ita y recognised 
Chlna ga ined the United Nations membe rs hip on 26 October, 
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The most critical effect of change in the international political 
structure was related to their political posture towards China. Both Japan 
and Australia follo'Vled the United States' "Cold ar" vie~'l on the region. As 
long as the United States adopted an anti-China stance, China's main 
criticism was directed towards the United states while her criticism of Japan 
and Australia was secondary. But when t e United States changed its view, 
China could immediately condemn Japan and Australia unless they altered 
their previous posture. Political confrontation between the governments 
damaged their bilateral trade relations much more than it did during the 
1960s. 
In response to a change in international circumstances, the Japanese 
and Australian governments searched for conditions to normalise relation~ 
with China. But their behaviour did not satisfy China's deman's. Although 
the Sa to Cabinet and the McMahon Cabinet acknowledged the necessity of 
r ecognIsIng China in the near future, they insisted that this should not be 
done at the expense of Taiwan. Bot Japan and Australia strongly opposed 
the loss of Taiwan's seat at.. the UnitEd . a:ions in exchange for China's 
entry. China insisted that Taiwan was an integral part of her territory, 
s o, it was necessary to sever political relations with Taiwan to establish 
diplomatic relations with China. It was impossible for Japan and ~ustralia 
t o establish diplomatic relations with China as long as they continued to 
main tain rel ations with Taiwan. 5 Consequently, bilateral economic exchange 
------_._-----_._-
I n reference to the Sato Cabinet's behaviour towards 
r ecognition of China, see Tanaka, Akihiko (1985) " Bei-Chu-So No 
Ai d ade (Beine In~luenced by the United States, China and the Soviet 
Union) " in Ratanabe, (ed.), QQ. cit., pp.220-253. In reference to 
t he McMahon government's behaviour towards recognition of China, see 
Rl l s on , 1. F. H. (1980), " Ch ina", in Hudson , H. J. (ed.), Australia in 
Horld Af f airs, 1 971-75. S ydney : George Al l e n 8. Unwin, pp.271-282; 
Andrews, QQ. ci t ., pp. 1 97 - 204, i and Fung 8. Mackerras, QQ. ci t. , 
p p. 11 8 -14 9. 
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was strongly influenced by political confrontation between the governments 
concerned. Two examples demonstrate clearly how strongly economic activities 
were influenced by politics .. 
J apanese Big usinessts Entry into the "Friendship Trade" 6 
From the beginning of the post- war Sino-Japanese trade relationship, 
big Japanese trading and manufacturing companies had actually dealt with 
China, but they refrained from direct involvement by using "Friendship 
Firms" or "L-T Trade" offices as intermediaries. Although China had 
deman ded a pro-Chinese attitude from "Friendly Firms", she did not make the 
same demands on big companies during the 1960s. 
In 1970, China required all companies including big business to have 
the same political attitude as the "Friendly Firms" in order to trade t.olith 
her. China refused to trade with those firms which: supported Taipei's 
revolt against mainland Chi:la and/or South Korea's invasion of North Korea; 
invested a large amount of capital in Taiwan and/or South Korea; exported 
weapons and ammunition fOl American use in Indo-China; and were affiliated 
with US firms as join t ventures or subsiduaries. 7 
6 On Japanese big business's entry into the "Friendship Trad e", 
see, Oga ta, Sad ak o (1 977), II Hi hon No Tai gai Sei saku Ket tei Ka tei To 
Zaikai (Japan's External Policy Making Process and Big Business)", 
in Hosoya, Chi hiro & Hatanuki, Joji (eds.) Taiqai Seisaku Kettei 
Katei No Nichi-bei Hikaku (Comparative Study of Japanese and 
American External Policy Making Process), To kyo: Uni versi ty o f Tokyo 
Press, pp.213-2 40 . 
7 Zhou-Enlai raised the four conditions, Rhen he met 
representatives of "Friendly Firms", and Japanese "Memorandum Trade" 
delegates, headed by Kenzo Matsumura, in April, 1970. See, Nitchu 
Kokko Kaituku Sokushin Giin Renmei (ed.), QQ. cit., pp.310-317. 
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The purpose of China's hard-line stance seems mainly to have been to 
galn political leverage through trade, rather than benefit. China was 
dissatisfied with the attitude of big Japanese companies and their abi:ity to 
trade with both China and her opponents concurrently. China r.'3.y have 
thought it better to sever relations with them to suit her political stance 
t han maintain relations for economic benefit, if Japanese companies rejected 
her demands. 
However, it is doubtful that China really intended to sever trade with 
Japa n. If bilateral trade had not continued, "Friendly Firms" and not 
Japanese big business would have suffered the most critical damage. As 
" Friendly Firms" were always on China's side, China would not be able to 
s ever rel ations with them. When Zhou Enlai announced the four conditions, 
he also insisted that bilateral trade should be expanded through "Friendsh~p 
Trade".8 In addition, he mentioned that China would welcome a visit by 
those business representatives who earnestly supported an improvement in 
bilateral relations, and that he did not care whether they were leftists or 
not, as it vI s difficult to find leftists in Japanese big business circles. 9 
His message implied that China wanted to establish closer contacts with big 
business rather than sever relations with them. China wai aware of the 
i nfluence of big business on Japan's policy-making. If she could encourage 
them to promote China 's political interests, she could gain an ad-/antage over 
the J apanese gove nment in the bilateral political relationship. Her 
approach also accounted for the economic role of big business. Sooner or 
8 
" Minute of Zhou Enlai's intervieR with representatives of 
" Friendly Firms" on 15 April, 1970" in Morishita (ed.), QQ. cit., 
p p.670-680. 
9 
"M inut e of Zhou Enlai ' s intervieR Rith r epresentatives of 
"F rie n dly Firms" on 24 Februa r y, 1971, in Morishi ta (ed.)) QQ. ci t, ) 
p . 69 1 ) p.695. 
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later, both countries would establish diplomatic relations and it seemed 
natural that th e chance of contact between Chinese authorities and Japa nese 
big business would increase in such a situation. China probably wanted to 
ascertain the behaviour of Japan ese big busi ness before embarking on f ull-
scale business with them. It is possible that China aimed at some kind of 
shock effect to gain the attention of Japanese big business when she 
suddenly announced strict conditions for bilateral trade. 
Although the conditions seemed severe, their application to busines s 
was not at all rigid. China condemned those firms whic~ had attended the 
Japan-China (Taiwan) Cooperation Committee, which had a political 
character. 1 0 But she did not require them to stop trade with Taiwan nor 
withdraw their existing capital from Taiwan. Most big Japanese companies 
could cont'nue to trade with China if tl ey refrained from further 
com ," tment to business with Taiwan and approved of China's political 
opinions about the Sino-Japanese relationship. So China, in effect, used 
both hard-line and soft-line stances depending on the situation. 
When China announced strict conditions to the big Japanese compan i es, 
many firms eventually decided to accept the conditions in order to maintai n 
trade with China. The chemical industry immediately conceded to China's 
demand because to the chemical industry, China was an extremely importa~t 
market for fertiliser, and its business with the United States, Taiwan and 
South Korea was very limited. So, it was not difficult for them to decide to 
accept China's conditions. 1 1 However, the steel industry responded 
1 0 The Japan-China (Taiwan) Cooperation Committee (Nikka Kyoryoku 
Iin-kai) was organised by pro-Taiwanese LDP politicians. Some big 
c ompanies attended the sub-committee on economics and trade in the 
Commi ttee. 
1 1 Oga t a, QQ. cit. , p.230. 
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differently. Although steel accounted for nearly half the value of Japanese 
exports to China, Japan also exported huge amounts of s teel to the United 
states. The value of steel exported to the US was about four times the 
value of the Chinese market. Moreover, business with Taiwan and South Korea 
was not negligible for companies such as the Nippon Steel Corporation. The 
impact of t he steel industry's decision on Japanese business circles was 
significant. Under these circumstances, responses varied among companies. 
The Sumitomo Metal Industries, at first, accepted China's conditions because it 
did not trade with Taiwan, and because it produced and exported immense 
amounts of seamless pipes of which China was the largest customer. That 
this company represented the interests of Kansai business circles, which had 
tradi tionally been interested in the China trade, was partly reflected in its 
quick response to China's conditions. On the other hand, the Nippon Steel 
Corporation, Japan's biggest company at that time, initially hesitated to 
accept the conditions and temporarily withdrew from the China trade. As the 
company had just conducted a historic merger under the supervision of the 
government, it seemed difficult for them to ignore the intentions of the 
government and to support China's political VIew. In addition Shigeo Nagano, 
Chairman of the company, was also President of the Japan Chamber of 
Commerce and Industry. He was known to be pro- Taiwan. He might have been 
concerned about the impact of the company's decision on Japanese business 
circles as well as in the government.! 2 
However, as the United States moved towards rapprochement with China 
and all the other steel companies accepted the conditions, the Nippon Steel 
Corporation finally decided to accept China's demand and join the 
forthcoming business mission to China in July 1971. This announcement 
1 2 i bid, p.230-231. 
----~--
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determined the general trend of Japanese big business circles. 1 3 
Subsequently, most big companies accepted the conditions and supported 
normalisation of bilateral relations. Kansai and Tokyo business circles sent 
missions to China in September and November 1971 respectively. They 
exchanged views with Zhou Enlai and other eminent Chinese figures. Both 
missions appealed strongly for normalisation of bilateral relations from t;~e 
viewpoint of national interest. 1 4 In the following year, corporation 
groups like the Mitsubishi and Mitsui groups organised their own missions to 
China to establish contact with the Chinese authorities. It seemed that 
Japanese business circles were moving ahead of the government: bilateral 
trade relations had already been normalised before the Japanese government 
officially recognised China. 
This example illustrates a general tendency among Japanese big 
business circles. When faced with a sensi ti ve issue, some companies, with 
particular interest in t' e matter, move at once, while others stand still and 
watch the situation. The most influential companies then act after they 
have confirmed the situation. Finally, most of them follow the general 
trend in order not to fall behind the others. 
In the process of normalisation of bilateral trade relations, the 
"Friendly Firms" played a very importan t role as intermediaries between the 
Chinese authorities and big Japanese companies. They not only sent 
information about China 's intentions to the big companies, but also persuaded 
1 3 NAGANO , Shigeo (1982), Haga Zaikai Jinsei (My Life in Big 
Business Circles). Tokyo: Daiyamondo-sha, p.145-148. 
1 4 See Ho-Chu Kans a i Zaikai Daihyo-dan (ed. )(1971), Ho-Chu Kansai 
Zaikai Daihyo-dan Hokoku-sho (Report from Kansai Business Circles 
De l egation to China) publication not for sale; and Keizai Doyu-kai 
(1976) , Keizai Doyu-kai Sanju-nen-shi (30 Years' History of Keizai 
Do yu-kai); Tokyo: Keizai Doyu-kai, p.569-573. 
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these companies to accept China's conditions. They helped businesses to 
organise missions to China . "Friendly Firms" were willing to act in such a 
way because their businesses relied on China's political stance and the 
commodities produced by big companies. Ironically, though such actions 
consequently led to the loss of their business when the big companies were 
able to contact the Chinese authorities directly and enter the trade with 
China. 
When China announced its conditions, Kiichi Miyazawa, the Hinister for 
International Trade and Industry, said that the government would not 
interfere with the decisions of private companies about which countries they 
would trade with, although the Japanese government disagreed with China's 
attitude about linking political concerns to trade. 1 ~ The Japanese 
government kept to its policy of separation of trade from politics. However, 
its stance towards Sino-Japanese trade changed significantl~r> compared with 
its previous attitude during the latter half of the 1960s. Previously, the 
gove~nment interfered with the actions of private companies, especially 
"Friendly Firms", when the actions were related to political matters. That 
the government now allowed private companies to accept China's political 
conditions indicated a significant concession. As the international situation 
changed in China's favour, the government connived at the behaviour of big 
companies. Moreover, the government advised them to refrain from further 
investment in Taiwan. 1 6 It also implied a resumption of credit by the Ex-
"Statement by MiyazaRa, the Hinister for Interna tional Trade 
and Industry, at the Committee on Commerce and Industry, the House 
of Representatives on 12 May, 1970" in Asahi Simbun-sha (ed. )(1972), 
2.Q.cit., pp.118-119. 
1 6 
"Comment by Foreign Hinister Fukuda on 16 April, 
Sasamoto 8. Shimakura (eds.) ( 1977), QQ. ci t., p.319. 
1971" in 
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1m Bank in near future. 1 7 Although the Sato Cabinet failed to normalise 
political relations with China by the end of its term, it began to assume a 
conciliatory attitude in the area of trade. The government no longer 
ignored pressures for normalisation of bilateral relations when Japanese big 
business, which provided powerful support to the government, backed it. 
China's Suspension of Wheat Purchase from ustralia 
While China continued to insist to the Japanese that trade should be 
inseparable from politics, she did not express any concrete opinions about 
Sino-Australian trade during the 1960s. At that time, China continued to 
import wheat from Australia without any complaints about the pol~tical 
situation. It was surmised that she did not want to mIX politics with trade. 
As the international atmosphere turned in China's favour, China's 
approach changed suddenly. In 1970, as soon as China had established 
diplomati c relations with Canada, China ordered huge amounts of wheat from 
Canada and did not renew the Australian wheat contract following the last 
delivery, which was carried out in October of the same year. Neither the 
Australian government nor the Wheat Board had expected this sudden change 
in China's attitude, and there were no safeguards to protect the Sino-
Australian wheat trade. As Australia had not concluded a long-term contract 
with China, she had to renew the contract annually, so every year the 
negotiations for a new contract took place only after China sent an 
i nvitation to the Wheat Board. The Board could not even contact Chinese 
authorities to enquire about the delay of the invitation, because the Board 
had no staff or agents in China and could get no information about China's 
1 7 
"Comment by Foreign Minister Fukuda, on 8 December, 1971" in 
ibid., p.3 19. 
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real intentions. Since the former contract had expired in October 1970, the 
Board could do nothing but wait for the invitation. The Board and the 
government expected to receive China's new order and they did not believe 
that China would stop wheat purchases from Australia for political reasons. 
In February 1971, Doug Anthony, the Minister for Trade and Primary Industry 
said: "Unfortunately this year no contract has been made yet, but I am still 
very hopeful and optimistic that we will hear from China before too 
long." 1 & 
China's action is explained, partly, from an economIC point of VIew. As 
China was enJOYIng a good crop harvest, she could afford to decrease 
imports. But this does not explain why China imported wheat only from 
Canada and why she even increased the volume of imports from Canada. If 
there had been a good harvest in some years during the 1960s, she would 
have decreased imports from Canada as well as Australia and would not have 
had to rely on a single supply source. 
It was the ALP delegation of July 1971 that confirmed China's real 
intention for the first time s'nce the previous contract had expired. This 
confirmation came through an interview with Bai Xiangguo, the Chinese Trade 
Minister. Bai explained to ALP delegates that "the Australian government's 
hostile policy towards China, following US imperialism, created certain 
obstacles in China's wheat trade with Australia" and that "economics and 
trade could not be separated from politics ... trade could only be continued 
and developed under a situation of normal relations between our two 
1 e CommonRealth Parliamentary Debates, the House of 
Representati ves, 22 February, 1971, p, 411; quoted from Bray, . 
Barbara, (1986), "China-Australia: The Poli tics of the Hheat Trade" 
an unpublished paper distributed at a semina~ Politics Department, 
Adelaide University, December 1986, p.7. 
.' 
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countries." 1 9 Clearly China preferred Canada to Australia for political 
reasons. China discriminated against Australia because Australia had no 
diplomatic relations with China. China would not buy wheat from Australia 
as long as the Australian government maintained to have a hostile political 
stance towards China. According to China, it was not the Wheat Board but 
the Australian government which was primarily responsible for the situation. 
The Australian government had to give up its policy of separation of the 
wheat trade from politics and recognise China if it wanted to resume wheat 
sales to China. 
The Australian government took an uncompromising stance towards 
China's demand. Anthony said: "I would not recognise Red China just to sell 
whea t. I would not sell my foreign policies or my philosophies just to try 
to do a trade deal." 2 0 When the ALP delegation confirmed China's intention, 
Prime Hinister McMahon condemned Whitlam for playing"the Chinese game by 
introducing politics into wheat". He also said: "We (the government] think 
our best interests will be served by leaving it to the Wheat Board and 
keeping it out of politics.,,2 t The government probably regarded China's 
demand as political blackmail and did not want to give any impression of 
political surrender under pressure from China. Moreover) the ALP had taken 
the initiative in normalisation of Sino-Australian relations. It was 
difficult for the government to follow the ALP's China policy which both 
parties had disputed for the previous two decades. As far as the wheat 
trade was concerned, the government had praised its own policy of separation 
1 9 FitzGerald (1972) .QQ. cit. \ p.28) p.29. 
2 0 Anthony's remarks Here made in a television intervieR on 7 
February) 1971 ln Bray) .QQ. ci t., p.7. 
2 1 The Age) 13 July 1971) quoted from Fi tzGerald (1972) .QQ. ci t. , 
p. 30. 
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of the wheat trade from politics so greatly that it was not easy to reverse 
course. As a result, the wheat trade could not be carried out until the 
political relations between China and Australia improved. 22 
Although the Australian government failed to eliminate obstacles in 
the wheat trade, some important progress took place in the trade of strategic 
related commodities. In May 1971, the government relaxed export controls on 
strategic items following a United states' decision. This relaxation indicated 
the possibility of new business opportunities. As Table 10 shows, exports of 
steel and non-ferrous metals increased rapidly. China did not mix politics 
with trade when dealing with private companies and did not insist on severe 
conditions with Australian big business as with Japanese big business. If 
China had adopted the same conditions in its dealing with Australian 
companies, many of them would not have traded with her. American companies 
invested huge amounts of capital in Australia. 2 3 Some Australian companies 
produced arms for use by their own troops in Vietnam. Several companies 
also invested in Taiwan. However, they did not face difficul ties in trading 
with China, and in fact, increased their business opportunities. For example, 
--_._----_ ._----_ ... _._-
2 2 China resumed Rheat purchases from Australia in September 
1972. This happened just three months before the general election, 
Rhich realised the ALP's victory. China, at that time, presumably 
considered that political relations between China and Australia Here 
getting better. However, Hilson argues that China's resumption of 
Rheat purchase annoyed the ALP. See Hilson, QQ. ci t., p.276-27 7. 
2 :3 In reference to American oRnership~ Bai, the Chinese Trade 
Minister , said: "China would not buy from Hholly-oHned subsidiari es 
or associates of US companies in Australia", but that "Australian 
firms Rith US capital Hould be considered separately, according to 
the percentage of US ca pi tal ". Bai' s remarks Here quoted from 
Fi tzGerald (1972), QQ. ci t., p.31. Compared to China's demand 
tOHards Japanese companies, this demand Has lenient. China might 
have taken account of Australian firms' special relationship Hith 
the US capi tal. 
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BHP, Australia's biggest company, which had an affiliated firm In Taiwan , 
succeeded In a $A 6.5 million steel sale to China In 1971.2 4 
China seems intentionally to have drawn a distinction between private 
companies and the Wheat Board which was a semi-governmental organisation , 
in order to express her complaint against the government more effectively. 
Because the wheat trade dominated the bilateral trade and had the support 
and supervision of the government, China's action against this trade was 
sufficient to send her message to the Australian government. A comparison 
between the wheat trade and the wool trade proves China's discriminations 
against the wheat trade. The Wool Corporation, a statutory organisation like 
the Wheat Board, was concerned with the wool trade. It gave technical 
assistance to wool producers and provided information about overseas markets 
to facilitate the wool trade. Such activities were partly subsidised by the 
government. However, the wool trade itself was carried out by private 
traders. Wool sales were implemented not on a single contract but on 
varlous contracts. 2 5 As Table 10 shows, the value of the wool trade a t 
that time increased. As the Wool Corporation was not the contractor in t he 
wool trade, China probably regarded wool sales not as semi-governmental 
trade but as private trade. China did not stop wool purchases from 
Australia nor intrude politics into the wool trade. 
Transformation of Sino-Japanese 
As Table 10 shows, Sino-Japanese trade grew steadily in the early 
1970s. Exports of steel and fertiliser continued to dominate Japanese 
2 4 Fung 8. Hackerras, QQ.. ci t., p. 113 . 
On Australia's Rool exports to China, 
pp. 276-283. 
see Albinski, QQ.. cit., 
Calendar 
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1970 
1 971 
19 72 
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Year-
1970171 
1971172 
1972173 
Ta hI e 10: Sino-Japanese TI'ade, 1970-72 and Sino-Australian Trade, 1970(71-72/73 
Japan's Exports to China 
Tota l . . Steel Fer-ti I i ser 
( $USmillion) ( $USmillion) %) ( $USmillion) 
568.87 237.34 ( 42) 88. 39 
578.18 270.89 ( 47) 99. 97 
608.92 244.72 ( 40) 119.76 
Australia's Exports to China 
Steel &. Non-Fer-r-ous 
Total Hheat Hetals Hool 
(SA million) ( SA million) ( ~O (SA million) ( %) ($A million) 
63 . 27 57. 47 ( 91) 1. 50 ( 2) 2. 46 
37. 25 0 ( 0) 24. 08 ( 65) 6. 86 
62. 84 16. 54 ( 17) 1 4 . 09 ( 22) 19. 42 
Sour-ce: Japane se Hinistr-y of Iter-national Tr-ade and Industr-y 
TSllSho Hakusho, Clihir.e Paper- on Tr-ade) 1971-1973 
Austr-alian Dur-eau of Statistics, Over-seas Tr-ade . 1970171-1972173 
( %) 
( 1 6) 
( 17) 
( 20) 
( %) 
( 4) 
( 1 8) 
( 31) 
Japan's Imports 
f rom China 
Total 
$USmillion) 
253. 81 
323.17 
491 . 1 1 
Australia's Imports 
from China 
Total 
(SA million) 
31 . 58 
41. 31 
49 .92 
...J 
U1 
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exports to China. Acceptance of China's conditions by Japanese companies 
producing these commodities prevented a decline of their exports. Increase 
in Japanese imports was mainly caused by a rapid growth of imports of 
textile materials and products. 
It seems important to look at the management of Sino-Japanese trade 
to explain the reasons for this increase in the bilateral trade. Bilateral 
trade was chiefly managed through "Friendship Trade" in this period. As 
Table 9 shot;1S, "Memorandum Trade", which was based on a quasi -governmental 
trade agreement, held less than 10 per cent of the total value of the 
bilateral trade. Even exports of principal items such as steel and 
fertiliser, which were initially to be dealt with by "L-T Trade" or 
"Memorandum Trade", shifted to "Friendship Trade". Big Japanese companies 
presumably preferred "Friendship Trade" to "Memorandum Trade" after China 
announced strict conditions against them. This was because China promised 
to promote "Friendship Trade" no matter how intense the political 
confrontation between the governments might become. "Friendship Firms" also 
gave them information about China~ intentions. Finally, for the steel 
industry, rejection of the conditions by one company did not influence other 
companies' business as, unlike "Memorandum Trade", trade contracts were 
concluded by individual companies under terms of "Friendship Trade". 2 b 
Sino-Australian trade, unlike Sino-Japanese trade, declined suddenly In 
the period concerned. Clearly, the intermission in wheat sales was the 
principal reason for the sudden decline of Australian exports to China in 
1971/72. Since the last contract had expired in October 1970, Australia was 
unable to export wheat to China until September 1972. As wheat sales had 
2 b Nitchu Keizai Kyokai, QQ. cit., pp.456-459. 
--_ ...... -
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taken up 90 per cent of Australian exports to China SInce 1965, the 
intermission of wheat sales caused enormous damage to the bilateral trade. 
Although wheat sales were not concluded during that period, exports of other 
commodities like metals increased in 1971/72. This was related to a 
relaxation of trade controls by the Australian government, and China's 
preference for private trade. Australian imports from China did not suffer 
from political confrontation between the governments. In fact imports 
increased and Australia recorded a bilateral trade deficit in 1971/72, the 
first time since wheat sales began in 1960/61. 
Intermission of Australian wheat exports to China occured partly 
because the Wheat Board monopolised Australian wheat sales. The Wheat Board 
was a statutory organisation, and its activities were supported and 
supervised by the government. As China saw the Wheat Board as a semi-
governmental organisation, the wheat trade was involved in a political 
confrontation between the governments. The Board could not get any 
information about China's demands because there was no intermediary like 
"Friendship Firms" between the Board and the Chinese authorities. Since the 
wheat trade was based on a single contract between the Board and the 
Chinese authorities, wheat growers had no other way of selling their wheat 
to China when the contract expired. 
In summary, the influence of political confrontation between the 
governments on bilateral trade increased in proportion to the degree of 
commitment by the government in the trade. Trade managed through semi-
governmental bodies suffered the most critical damage from political 
confrontation. As Sino-Japanese trade was mainly managed through the 
private sector, it was almost free from the influence of political 
confrontation. Sino-Australian trade, on the other hand, was dominated by 
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the wheat trade, managed through a semi -governmental body. As a result, it 
was seriously affected by the political dispute between the two governments. 
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Chapter VI: Incentives and Limits to Trade Wifhout Diplomatic Relations 
By summarIsIng the arguments developed in the thesis, this chapter 
reconsiders the incentives for and limits of Sino-Japanese and Sino-
Australian trade in the period when there were no diplomatic relations 
between the states concerned. 
Incentives to Trade Without Diplomatic Relations 
During the 1960s, Japan and Australia were able to maintain trade with 
China although they did not have diplomatic relations with her. There were 
several common factors which facilitated the continuance of trade despite 
the absence of diplomatic relations. 
First, Japan and Australia aimed to separate the bilateral trade from 
the problem of their diplomatic relations with China. The absence of 
diplomatic relations resulted from the structure of alliance with West 
countries rather than any specific political issues between the states 
concerned. As political harmony with the United States, was at the core of 
Japanese and Australian foreign policy, it was almost impossible for Japan 
and Australia to establish diplomatic relations with China without 
jeopardising their relations with the United States. As it took a long time 
to solve political issues which created obstacles to establishing diplomatic 
relations with China, and as the China trade was of economic interest to 
Japan and Australia, Japan and Australia avoided using trade as an 
instrument of politics, taking into account the possible damage to their own 
economIes. Hence, Japan and Australia separated trade from politics, and put 
the trade issue first in their relations with China. 
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At that time, China, also gave priority to trade rather than diplomatic 
relations with Japan and Australia. China stressed, in principle, that trade 
should be inseparable from politics and the bilateral trade could develop 
only when political relations were improved. However, China took a flexible 
stance in practice. In both Sino-Japanese and Sino-Australian trade during 
the 1960s, China, in fact, did not interrupt the bilateral trade for political 
reasons. Her flexible stance towards the bilateral trade with Australia and 
Japan partly resulted from the international political circumstance. China 
was isolated from the international society in both political and economic 
terms. The United States kept up a total trade embargo against China in 
line with her China containment strategy. The Soviet Union began to reduce 
economic support to China because of the Sino-Soviet political split. Thus, 
China was compelled to approach capitalist countries other than the United 
States as alternative trade partners. For this purpose, Japan and Australia 
became China's important trade partners although they had no diplomatic 
relations with China. 
Thirdly, there was economIC incentive to trade between the states 
concerned, as illustrated by the composition of their trade. In the case of 
Sino-Japanese trade, a highly complementary relationship between both 
economies became an incentive to bilateral trade. Japan exported heavy and 
chemical industrial goods, which accelerate China's economic development. 
China, in return, provided Japan with raw material and food, which satisfied 
Japan's demand. In the case of Sino-Australian trade, Australian wheat 
exports dominated trade. Apart from the wheat trade, there was no active 
economIC exchange between Australia and China. It was this wheat trade that 
provided a strong incentive to the bilateral trade in the period concerned. 
Australia sought a new market for her huge stocks of unsold wheat, as she 
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had begun to lose traditional markets such as Europe. China, sought to 
import wheat because she had suffered from a food shortage caused by 
successive crop failures. Therefore, wheat exports from Australia to China 
could satisfy economic needs of both countries. 
Fourthly, the relevant private sector which was involved in the 
bilateral trade was powerful enough to influence the government's trade 
policy. There were several business representatives in Japan who were 
involved in trade with China. As there were persons doing business with 
China at various levels of Japanese society, some members of the Liberal 
Democratic Party (the government party) as well as those of the Japanese 
Socialist Party and the Japanese Communist Party supported the China trade. 
The Japanese government could not neglect opinion in the parliament. 
Comparatively, there were few persons involved in the China trade in 
Australia. But Australia's wheat farmers were an important electorate for 
the Country Party (one of the components of the coalition government), which 
had strong influence on Australian trade policy especially when agricultural 
commodities held nearly three-quarters of Australian total exports. 
Management of Trade Without Diplomatic elations 
Although political and economlC conditions in Sino-Japanese and Sino-
Australian trade during the 1960s were similar, management of Sino-Japanese 
trade differed from that of Sino-Australian trade. This difference probably 
arose from the character of trade items and actors involved in this trade. 
With the Sino-Japanese trade, varlOUS items were exchanged by many 
private trading companies. To secure their business with China under 
unstable political circumstances, Japanese business representatives sought 
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two measures. The first one was "L-T Trade". "L-T Trade" was carried ou t 
based on a long term agreement between representatives of the Liberal 
Democratic Party and the Chinese authorities. "L-T Trade" dealt with 
principal trade items on the basis of barter exchanges. Both the Japanese 
and the Chinese governments, in principle, supported trade activities under 
this agreement. In this sense, the "L-T Trade" agreement functioned as a 
quasi-governmental agreement. The second one was "Friendship Trade". This 
trade was carried out by hundreds of special private trading companies 
called "Friendly Firms". These firms were backed by the Japanese Socialist 
Party or the Japanese Communist Party. China authorised these firms as 
"Friendly Firms" on condition that they accepted China's political view on 
Sino-Japanese relations. In this way, "Friendly Firms" not only gained 
exclusive business opportunities with China but also a certain guarantee 
from the Chinese authorities. 
But with Sino-Australi an trade, there was nothing like "L-T Trade" nor 
"Friendship Trade". The Wheat Board monopolised Australian wheat sales to 
China. Activities of the Board were supported and supervised by the 
Australian government, and the commercial bargaining position between the 
Board and China ln the period concerned was in favour of the Board. That 
wheat trade was, ln fact, successfully managed without any long-term 
agreements or guarantees from China. There was little trade of other 
commodities because of the lack of effective promotive measures. Among 
commodities traded, strategic items were strictly controlled by the Australian 
government. 
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Limrrts In Trade Without Diplomatic Relations 
Sino-Japanese and Sino-Australian trade in the period concerned 
demonstrated that trade can be maintained despite the absence of diplomatic 
relations. It also illustrated that there were limits to trade becaus e of t he 
absence of diplomatic relations and because of political influence on trade, 
though some of the limits were related to the nature of items traded and the 
operational style of trade. 
For example, Australian exports of strategic items to China were 
strictly and widely controlled by the government for political reasons. 
Wheat trade, on the other hand, was less influenced by politics. The 
Japanese government sometimes intervened in "Friendship Trade" because it 
was managed through pro-Chinese companies. In contrast, the government , at 
least initially, promoted "L-T Trade", as several members of the Libera l 
Democratic Party had committed themselves to it. 
Although "L-T Trade" between Japan and China and the wheat trade 
between Australia and China were relatively well-managed, there were l i mi t s 
in the trade promotion by the Japanese and Australian governments. They 
hesitated to involve themselves directly in trade with China, and the l ssue 
of financial support from official agencies proved this attitude. The 
Japanese government did not extend supplier's credit from the Export-Impor t 
Bank for exports of industrial plant to China. The Australian governmen t 
kept the Export Payment Insurance Corporation from underwriting insurance 
on wheat credit sales to China. Both governments presumably considered that 
the official financial support might have a negative influence on their 
relations with other countries, especially the United States, as well as their 
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own political stances towards China. They, therefore, avoided direct 
commitment to the China trade. Although their motives of their attitude was 
similar, the influence on bilateral trade was quite different. As the export 
credit was indispensable to realising exports of industrial plant, Japan 
could not export any industrial plants because of the rejection of export 
credit. As a result, "L-T Trade" itself declined as China regarded the 
Japanese government's rejection as a main obstacle in the trade. Australian 
wheat sales to China continued without official credit since official credit 
was not critical for wheat sales in practice. 
The Change in International Environment and its Influence on ilateral 
Trade 
Since the "Cold War" had conditioned Sino-Japanese and Sino-Australian 
political and economic relations during the 1960s, a dramatic change in 
international political environment from the late 1960s to the early 1970s 
had significant influence on Sino-Japanese and Sino-Australian trade. The 
Sino-American rapprochement put an end to the "Cold War", and strengthened 
China's bargaining power in her negotiations with Japan and Australia. 
China may have considered establishment of diplomatic relations more 
important than trade in her relations with Japan and Australia. China used 
trade as an instrument for this political end. She required Japan and 
Australia to change their political attitudes so as to establish diplomatic 
relations. For this purpose, China intentionally discriminated against trade 
with governmental or semi-governmental bodies in both countries. The 
Japanese and Australian governments, at least initially, hesitated to change 
their policies. But they refrained from a further intervention in the 
private sector's trading activities. The Japanese government allowed big 
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companies to join "Friendship Trade" and the Australian government eased the 
trade embargo on strategic items. 
Consequently, Sino-Japanese and Sino-Australian trade changed their 
character. With Sino-Japanese trade, "Friendship Trade", which China wanted 
to promote, grew rapidly, while "Memorandum Trade", which succeeded "L-T 
Trade", slumped. As Sino-Japanese trade at that time was carried out under 
"Friendship Tradetl , the total value of trade increased despite the increase 
of political influence on bilateral trade. Sino-Australian trade was 
dominated by the wheat trade, which was managed by the Wheat Board. Since 
China regarded the Board as a semi-governmental body, she suspended wheat 
purchase from Australia until bilateral political relations improved. As a 
result, the total value of Sino-Australian trade decreased suddenly. 
However, trade of new items such as steel or non-ferrous metals, which had 
been controlled by the Australian government, emerged. 
Sino-Japanese and Sino-Australian trade between 1960 and 1972, reveal 
several common and several differing factors which encouraged or restricted 
trade without diplomatic relations. Although it is risky and sometimes 
misleading to generalise about trade relations between states which have no 
diplomatic relations based only on two specific cases, this study may provide 
some insights into the issue of trade without diplomatic relations of a 
general kind. 
In general, bilateral trade without diplomatic relations is influenced 
by political relations between the states concerned and the international 
political environment. When the main obstacle in establishing diplomatic 
relations is related to the international political environment rather than 
specific bilateral political issues, states tend to put their economic interest 
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first and maintain trade without diplomatic relations. But when the 
establishment of diplomatic relations becomes a major bilateral political 
lssue, trade is often used as an instrument to achieve this political end. 
Under the circumstances, states can no longer separate trade from politics, 
and in fact, politics has greater influence on trade than before. 
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